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I. INTRODUCTION

On September the 11th, enemies of freedom
committed an act of war against our country.
Americans have known wars - but for the past 136
years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for
one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the
casualties of war - but not at the center of a great city
on a peaceful morning. Americans have known
surprise attacks - but never before on thousands of
civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single
day - and night fell on a different world, a world
where freedom itself is under attack.'
September 1lth, 2001 was a date of historical enormity. The whole
world understood what devastating consequences terror could have.

1. President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American
People, Sept. 20, 2001, available atwww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.htm
(last visited Feb. 13, 2003). President Bush went on to declare that "[Qfreedom and fear are at war."
Id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss4/1
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Terrorism was no longer confined to areas outside the borders of the
superpower; terror had struck at its heart.
The struggle of the United States with terrorism is not a new
phenomenon. In the last decade, a number of brutal terrorist attacks have
occurred in the United States. For example, a number of years ago, on
February 26th, 1993, six people were killed and hundreds wounded in a
blast at the World Trade Center. At that time it was thought that this was
the most ferocious terrorist act possible on American soil. Eight and a half
years later, at that very same location, realization dawned that even more
barbarous acts could be perpetrated.
In retaliation for the terrorist attack on the United States on September
11 th, 2001, the United States declared war against terror. In the same
speech where this declaration was made, President Bush informed the
American Congress as follows:
Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end
there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has
been found, stopped and defeated .... This is not, however, just
America's fight. And what is at stake is notjust America's freedom.
This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight
of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and
freedom. 2
Declarations of war against terror had been heard throughout the
United States even before the September 1 1th attack. Such calls
accompanied the air strike against Libya in 1986, the strike on Iraq
following the failed assassination attempt on former President George
Bush, and the attack in 1998 against camps in Afghanistan linked to
Osama bin Laden. All these initiatives were considered part of the ongoing
war against terror, and were in the language of the Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, "the war of the future." 3
Yet, after the lethal terrorist attack on September 11th, 2001, the
declaration of war on terror obtained a different significance. The entire
world now understands the threat that terrorism poses to the lives of the
citizens of the free world. It is a terrorism that has grown, developed and
spread. Its objectives are multiple and the means which are available for
carrying them out are diverse. The fear that terrorists will make use of

2. Id.
3. New Kind of War for U.S., L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1998, at B4.
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nuclear, chemical and biological weaponry is growing. In the words of one
commentator:
As terrorists' targets have increased, so too has their ability to
strike at those 'targets. While the ends of terrorism become
increasingly diffuse, the means available to them are becoming
increasingly deslructive. . . . There is a horrifying symmetry
between the proliferation of terrorists who seek mass destruction
and the proliferation of weapons that can accomplish it. . . . A
single terrorist, armed with such deadly materials, could hold an
entire nation and its government hostage.4
It is true that in the latest attack, all that was needed were four planes
and knives. Nonetheless, it is hard to believe that the terrorists would have
avoided using more devastating weaponry had that been feasible.
The danger of terrorism menaces us all. Israel is not the only country
vulnerable to routine threats of terror and vicious attacks by suicide
bombers. The threat is universal.
The same future war which Secretary of State Albright talked about in
1998 became a reality on September 1lth, 2001. But this war is not a
conventional war. This is a war with an enemy that has no address. The
war on terror lacks the traditional character of war, where one can identify
the sides by using clear geographical delineations. Bin Laden's training
camps in Afghanistan are not the sole target. Terrorist organizations have
established cells in almost every country.
[W]hile it is psychologically reassuring to be able to point the
finger of blame at a particular individual, such as Osama bin Laden
or Sheik Abdel-Rahman, behind such men lie diffuse and shadowy
networks of activists and sympathizers, many of whom may be
implicated, directly or indirectly. The enemy in the "war on
terrorism" is not just these notorious individuals but an amorphous,
largely invisible mass. How can a government fight such an
invisible enemy? 5
We must ask ourselves what does this war include? The laws of war
were established on the premise that war is an action between two

4. Dov Waxman, Terrorism: The War ofthe Future, 23 FLETCHERF. WORLDAFF. 201,203
(1999).

5. Id. at 204.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss4/1
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sovereign entities. Today we are facing a different type of war: the war on
terror.
In this Article, we shall try to define this new kind of war. We shall
analyze the rules of war in the modem age and examine whether these
rules are also applicable in an unconventional war - a war on terror. This
is a war with an enemy that does not observe the limits of violence and
force; an enemy which aspires to realize its irrational ideology in an
irrational way, showing total disregard for the value of human life, of
either its own terrorist "soldiers" or, of course, of its enemies.
In Part II, we shall present the main principles of the laws of war: the
prohibition on war in the modem age and the obligition to resolve disputes
by peaceful means. Part III will deal with self-defense as an exception to
the prohibition on war. We will present the different interpretations given
to the circumstances in which a state may exercise its right to self-defense
under customary international law and under treaty law. In Part IV, we
shall -elaborate on the restrictions imposed on the combatants and
investigate how these restrictions are implemented when the combatants
are not states and only one party is restricted. Part V will present the moral
justifications for allowing a state to exercise its right to self defense
against a terrorist organization as opposed to another state. We shall
examine whether the current law provides states with tangible means for
dealing with the threats facing them.
Part VI will deal with states which give shelter to terrorists. The
President of the United States declared after the attack of September 11,
that the global war on terrorism was not aimed solely at catching the
terrorists, but would also deal with countries which offer support and
shelter to terrorist organizations. 6 We shall try to characterize a state which
affords shelter to terrorists, and whether the fact that it does so makes it
vicariously liable for the acts of the terrorist organization.
Part VII will present the different means which are available to a
democratic country battling terrorism, starting with non-physical measures
such as economic or diplomatic sanctions through to physical measures
such as targeted personnel elimination. Part VIII will consider the most
important and difficult question of all - can terrorism be defeated? Can
the threat and fear of terrorist attacks be totally eliminated? Victory over
terrorism means dismemberment of each part of the vast terror network
which exists today. No part may be left intact. If it is, the network will
rebuild itself and the threat will continue to persist. Is such an outcome
realistic?

6. Bush, supra note I.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003
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Finally, in Part IX we shall consider whether new laws of war against
terrorism are needed. The laws of war were established in order to govern

the position between states or,at the least, between parties which honor the
rules of international law. We, however, are faced with a different and
more complicated reality, one that entails war with a party which breaks
every possible rule of the laws of war. Does this reality undermine the
basis on which the laws of war were established and force a change in
international legislation? Or does it, perhaps, require an interpretation of
the prevailing law which is adjusted to the new reality, in order to meet the
challenging needs of war between the democratic state and the terrorist
organization?

R. DECLARATIONS OF WAR INCONTEMPORARY TIMES IN WHICH CIRCUMSTANCES?

A. The Duty to Resolve by NegotiationsDisputes Which Provide
Groundsfor Declaring War
In the Nineteenth Century, international law conferred a legal right
upon every state to go to war at its own absolute discretion. War was the
principal prerogative of the sovereign state and evidence of the existence
of sovereignty. This doctrine, acknowledging freedom to declare and
initiate war, is no longer valid. In contemporary times, both treaty and
customary international law prohibit war in interstate relations.
The effort to restrict the freedom to wage war through the framework
of international law commenced in the Hague peace committees of 1899
and 1907. Article 2 of the first Hague Convention on the Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes provided that in the event of a grave dispute, before
resorting to the use of force, the contracting parties agreed to accept the
mediation or good offices of a friendly state, in so far as circumstances
permitted The Second Hague Convention Respecting the Limitation of
the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts contained an
undertaking by the contracting parties to recover the debt initially by
proposing arbitration; only if that debtor state rejected the proposal,

7. YORAM DiNSTEoN, THE LAWS OF WAR 46 (1983).
8. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899 32 Stat.
1779, 187 Consol. T.S. 410, amended Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199, 205 Consol. T.S. 233.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss4/1
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prevented the implementation of the arbitration agreement or refused to
comply with the award was the use of force allowed. 9
The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact transformed the entire situation.'0 The
Pact renounced the right to go to war, the contracting parties condemned
resort to war as a means of resolving international disputes, and they
agreed to settle their disputes by-peaceful means only." It should be noted
that the general renunciation of war was not all-embracing. Three
circumstances were retained in which war could be declared - in selfdefense, as a foreign policy measure, and as a measure outside the mutual
relations between the contracting parties.' 2
The primary development in modem times prohibiting the use of force
in order to resolve disputes and impose a duty to resolve disputes through
negotiations took place within the framework of the U.N. Charter of 1945.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the United States, Britain,
France, the Soviet Union, and China decided to take to heart the lesson of
the war, namely that the rules of dispute resolution had not achieved their
primary purpose - the peaceful and secure coexistence of states. Thus, on
April 25th, 1945, representatives of about fifty states met in San Francisco,
California, to discuss the establishment of a body to be called the United
Nations. On October 24th, 1945, the U.N. Charter entered into force. The
guiding principle of the U.N. Charter is that the use of force is prohibited.
The purpose of the U.N. Charter is set out in article 1(1): "To maintain
international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace."' 3
Article 2(3) provides that "[a]ll Members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security, and justice, are not endangered."' 4 Article 2(4) provides that
"[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."' 5 In effect, the U.N. Charter entrenches and adds to the

9. Hague Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the
Recovery of Contract Debts, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, 1 Bevans 607.
10. GeneralPactfor the Renunciation of War, 22 AM. J.INT'LL. 171 (1928).
11. Id.
12. DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 51.
13. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
14. Id. art. 2, para. 3.
15. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
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basic principles which developed as a matter of customary international
law following the Hague Conventions. The U.N. Charter prohibits the use
of war for the entire international community. Thus, article 2(4) prohibits
the use of force against any state, not only against U.N. members. Nor is
the prohibition limited to the U.N. members; Article 2(6) requires the
organization to "ensure that states which are not members of the United
Nations act in accordance with these Principles."' 6
The U.N. Charter creates a legal structure prohibiting the use or threat
of force, with two exceptions. These are found in article 51 - self-defense,
and article 42 - collective security. It is an interesting question whether the
duty to resolve disputes by negotiations, i.e., the prohibition on the use of
force, applies solely to interstate relations, or whether it may also be
applied to relations between a state and an organization which is not a
state, for example, a terrorist organization. Part V of this Article will
attempt to answer this question.
B. InternationalInstitutionsfor Peaceful Dispute Resolution
The U.N. Charter sets out the rules which had developed in customary
international law regarding the peaceful resolution of disputes. The U.N.
Charter proposes a number of ways of resolving disputes which threaten
international peace and security. Article 33(1) in Chapter 6 of the U.N.
Charter instructs that "[tihe parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."' 7
The U.N. Security Council is the body that has the responsibility for
ensuring that disputes are indeed resolved by peaceful means. It has the
power to investigate any dispute or any situation that might threaten
international peace and security,18 "recommend appropriate procedures or
methods of adjustment,"' 9 and as a general rule ensure that the dispute is
referred to the International Court of Justice. °
Should the parties to the dispute fail to resolve it by negotiations,
consultation, arbitration, or similar means, they must refer the dispute to

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. art. 2, para. 6.
Id. art. 33, para. 1.
U.N. CHARTER art. 34.
Id. art, 36, para. 1.
Id. art, 36, para. 3.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss4/1
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the U.N. Security Council, 2' which may, with the consent of the parties,
"make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement
of the dispute.. 22 Apart from U.N. Charter devices for pacific dispute
resolution, state practices have developed, under the inspirational influence
of the U.N. Charter, aimed at peacefully concluding international disputes
which have the potential for becoming armed conflicts. One prominent
example of such a practice is the initiative taken from time to time to hold
an international peace conference under the auspices of a third party,
usually a superpower, with the objective of bridging the differences
between the hostile parties and encouraging negotiations. The Madrid
Conference (October 30th, 1991), with the participation of Israel and its
neighbors - Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan, was the outcome of an
international initiative taken by the United States and the Soviet Union.
The Madrid Conference attempted to promote true peace in the Middle
East by means of direct negotiations between the parties. For the first time,
a framework was created for additional joint meetings between the parties
involved in the Arab-Israeli dispute. The Madrid Conference did not
achieve additional practical results, but it was a significant step forward in
the effort to prevent the dispute from deteriorating into renewed armed
conflict.

III. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE IN THE MODERN AGE
We have seen that in the modem age, the right to resort to war is
limited, and today it has almost ceased to exist. However, the prohibition
on waging war is not absolute. Over the years, a number of exceptions
have remained which permit the use of force. Most prominent of these is
the right to engage in self-defense. In this section, we shall distinguish
between self-defense in customary international law and self-defense in
treaty law.
A. Self-Defense in Customary InternationalLaw
The Hague Convention of 1907 regulates the laws of war and forms an
integral part of customary international law. Accordingly, not only are the
contracting states to the Hague Convention obliged to comply with it, but
all states - including states which are not signatories - must abide by its

21. Id. art. 37, para. 1.
22. Id. art. 38.
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rules.23 A state which violates the rules of war by infringing the
sovereignty of another state, vests the state under attack with the right to
self-defense.
Self-defense in customary international law is based on the
international dispute between Britain and America which gave rise to the
CarolineDoctrine.24 In1837, rebels rising against British rule in Canada
enjoyed the support of the American population along the border. The
rebels took control of an island on the Canadian side of the Niagara River,
and made use of the American steamer Carolinefor smuggling people and
weapons from the United States to the island. The American authorities
knew of these activities, but preferred to turn a blind eye to them. When
British protests failed to close down this supply line to the rebel forces, a
British military force captured the vessel in the middle of the night in U.S.
territorial waters, and cast her adrift to be completely destroyed over the
Niagara Falls. Two American citizens were killed during the incident. The
U.S. government protested to Britain against the violation of U.S.
sovereignty, however, Britain argued that it had acted in self-defense.25
The U.S. Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, responding to the contention,
acknowledged that such an action could be justified as self-defense,
provided that Great Britain could "show a necessity of self-defence,
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation. 26 In other words:
1. It is necessary that the threat be immediate, or at the least, real and
tangible.
2. The response is needed in order to defend against the threat.
3. The response must be proportional to the threat, restricted by the need
for self-defense and clearly left within its framework. The response
may not be unreasonable.
4. The response of self-defense is the last and not the first option. First,
all other means which do not require the use of force must be
exhausted. At the least, it must be shown that an effort was made to
resolve the dispute in such a manner.

23. DiNSTEN, supra note 7, at 19-22.
24. See Alberto R. Coll, The Legaland MoralAdequacy ofMilitaryResponses to Terrorism,
81 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 297, 301 (1987) (for background on the Carolineincident).
25. Robert F. Teplitz, Taking AssassinationAttempts Seriously:Did the UnitedStates Violate

InternationalLaw in Forcefully Responding to the Iraqi Plot to Kill George Bush? 28 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 569, 574-77 (1995).
26. Id. at 577.
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Customary international law permits self-defense in every case of
aggression, whereas treaty law enables self-defense only in cases of armed
attack. The term "aggression" is the broader of the two expressions.
Threats and declarations of future aggression are sufficient to establish
aggression which gives rise to a right to self-defense. In this way,
customary international law enables preemptive war to be conducted, with
the object of foiling the disaster which is anticipated.27
B. Self-Defense underArticle 51 of the U.N. Charter
As an exception to the central principle providing for peaceful conflict
resolution, article 51 of the U.N. Charter allows the use of force in selfdefense:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.2"
Article 51 uses the language of exercising the right to self-defense
against armed attack, whereas customary international law is concerned
with self-defense against acts of aggression. The term "armed attack" is
not defined in the U.N. Charter, with the result that different
interpretations have been given to it - one narrow and the other broad.
1. The Narrow Interpretation
The proponents of the narrow interpretation rely on the language of the
U.N. Charter. In their view, use of the term "armed attack" as opposed to
"aggression" is deliberate and not careless. This is because other articles

27. DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 19-22.
28. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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in the U.N. Charter make use of the term "aggression. 29 Article 51
deliberately chose to make use of the term "armed attack" in order to
circumscribe the scope of activity available to a state when engaging in
self-defense. Armed attack is a form of aggression; however, while threats
and declarations alone are sufficient in order to establish aggression, they
are insufficient to comprise an armed attack. The attack must be carried
out with weapons. It must consist of the use of actual physical force
against a state in order for that state to have the right to engage in selfdefense. Accordingly, preemptive war is not permitted under Article 51,
notwithstanding that it is permitted by customary international law.3"
Self-defense is not allowed save as a response to a direct physical
attack carried out by one state within the territory of another state. In cases
of terrorist acts, only the state under attack may assert a right to selfdefense. Clearly, such an assertion cannot be made by a foreign state; as
Boyle has explained, "self-defense could only be exercised in the event of
an actual or perhaps at least imminent 'armed attack' against the State
itself."'"
According to the narrow approach, the right to self-defense only arises
after the occurrence of the armed attack or, at the least, a high and real
likelihood of such an occurrence. 2 Thus, under this approach, the right to
self-defense should not be exercised in order to punish an attacking state
in the absence of a continuing threat.33
It should be pointed out that in Nicaragua v. United States, the
International Court of Justice held that terrorist activities do not amount to
' It is widely considered that the U.N. Security Council
an "armed attack."34
has consistently adhered to the narrow approach. In the majority of its
decisions, the U.N. Security Council has condemned the actions taken in
self-defense by the state "under attack., 35 However, the U.N. Security

29. See, e.g., id. art. 39: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.. ." (emphasis added).
30. DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 19-22.

31. Francis A. Boyle, Military Responses to Terrorism:Remarks of FrancisA. Boyle, 81
PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'LL. 288 (1987), quoted in Robert J. Beck & Anthony C. Arend, Don't Tread
on Us: InternationalLaw and ForcibleState Responses to Terrorism, 12 WIS. INT'LL.J. 153, 197
(1994).
32. Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, InternationalLaw, and the Use of Military Force, 18
WIS. INT'L L.J. 145, 162 (2000).

33. Id.
34. Id. at 158.
35. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 573, U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2615 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/573
(1985). This resolution rejected Israel's claim that it had acted in self-defense when carrying out
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Council is a political organ. In contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court, it is not
bound by its previous decisions. Every decision stands on its own, and is
dependent upon its own special circumstances. An example of the narrow
interpretation may be seen in the recent decision taken by the U.N.
Security Council following the terrorist attack on the United States on
September 1lth, 2001,36 where it identified a right to self-defense in
connection with an act of terror.37 It is possible to conclude from this
resolution that despite the decision in Nicaragua,acts of terror can in fact
be in the nature of an armed attack.38
2. The Broad Approach
Those advocating the broad approach explain that in the light of the
special language used by the U.N. Charter - "nothing... shall impair the
inherent right of ... self-defense" - it is clear that the intention is to
preserve the right to self-defense as acknowledged in customary
international law. Article 51 indeed emphasizes only one form of
legitimate self-defense, namely, a response to armed attack, but this does
not have to be interpreted as negating other forms of self-defense which
are permitted as a matter of customary international law. 39 The
interpretation given to "inherent right" is one that permits the use of force
for the purpose of self-defense in accordance with the requirements
established by the Caroline Doctrine. Moreover, the argument runs, the
right is absolute as the U.N. Charter declares that nothing will impair it.4°
Others assert that the language of the U.N. Charter requires an armed
an operation in 1985 against the headquarters of the PLO near Tunis. Id. The resolution condemned
the act of aggression perpetrated by Israel. Id.
36. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001).
37. Said Mahmoud commented as follows:
The Security Council is now obviously faced with a situation that profoundly
differs from the situation in 1985 when Palestinian groups carried out individual
attacks on Israeli targets, normally with limited casualties. That is why the
members of the Security Council, in their [R]esolution 1368 (2001) in
contradistinction to Resolution 573 (1985), unanimously recognize the right of
each State to individual and collective self-defense in situations like the present
one in the US.
See Said Mahmoudi, ASIL Insights: Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,
available at www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2003).
38. See infra Part V (for an extensive discussion).
39. See James P. Terry, Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism:A Law-PolicyAnalysis, 36
NAVALL. REV. 159, 170 (1986).
40. Teplitz, supra note 25, at 580.
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attack and not a direct armed attack, so that the intention is to include
different forms of attack so long as they are armed.4 '
Some scholars argue against the idea that self-defense refers only to the
use of force by a state in response to a real threat to territorial integrity or
sovereignty. These scholars suggest that such an interpretation ignores the
fact that the U.N. Charter characterizes the right to self-defense as
"inherent." Thus, states will defend their citizens even when the attack
does not amount to a real threat to their territory or independence.
Adopting the narrow interpretation of the right to self-defense would give
terrorists an enormous advantage in their war against democracy.42 The
broad interpretation would adapt the right to self-defense against an armed
attack to the modem understanding of such attacks. In other words, today
an armed attack may be carried out in a variety of ways, quite apart from
invading the territory of another state in the traditional sense. These ways
include terrorist acts as well as the use of chemical or biological weapons.
The narrow interpretation is not suitable in such cases, and may lead states
to conclude that international law in its present form does not provide an
adequate answer for modem developments in armed conflicts. It is true
that one cannot allow a situation where states may react with military force
against every threat to their security and the security of their citizens, even
if these threats do not reach the level of an armed attack. It is necessary for
control and restrictions to be imposed on the exercise of military force.
Thus, the United Nations must adapt the criteria for the exercise of selfdefense to global developments where armed attacks are no longer
restricted to invasion by a state.43 One way of doing so is by interpreting
the term "armed attack" - which is not defined in the U.N. Charter - in
accordance with the meaning ascribed to "aggression." 44 Aggression was
defined by the U.N. General Assembly in 1975: "The use of armed force
by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State, or inany other manner inconsistent with
the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition. 45

41. Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to Amend
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 HoUS. J.INT'LL. 25, 41-42 (1987).
42. Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, The Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV.
89. 101 (1989).
43. Teplitz, supra note 25, at 614.
44. Id.
45. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2319th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RESI3314 (1975).
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Paragraph 2 of the Resolution states that an initial attack amounts,
prima facie, to an act of aggression.' Paragraph 3 of the Resolution states
that each of the following acts is an act of aggression:
1. Invasion, an attack by armed forces, military occupation or the forced
annexation of another state.
2. Bombing or use of any weapons against the territory of another state.
3. Blockading the coast or ports of another state.
4. Attacks by the armed forces of one state against the land, sea or air
forces of another state.
5. Use of the military force of one state, located in the territory of another
state under an agreement with that state, in breach of the said
agreement.
6. Permitting a second state to make use of the territory of the first state
in order to carry out an act of aggression against a third state.
7. Sending armed bands to carry out serious attacks in the nature of the
acts listed above against another state.4'
Article 4 of the Resolution explains that this list is not exhaustive and
may be expanded by the U.N. Security Council.48 Such a definition of an
armed attack will justify a response in self-defense against an act of terror
carried out by armed groups against a state. This assertion is based on the
assumption that it can be shown that the armed groups were sent by a
sovereign entity. In the alternative, since the list is not exhaustive, it may
be adjusted to the varying circumstances in which an armed attack is
initiated by armed forces, such as a terrorist organization, which is not sent
by one specific state against another state.
A different interpretation of the term "armed attack" was offered by
Rowles in a panel held on terrorism by the American Society of
International Law in 1987. In Rowles' opinion, a military response to
terrorist attacks must be allowed on the grounds of self-defense only when
these attacks are "on a scale equivalent to what would be an armed attack
if conducted by government forces."5 ° In other words, military response
should only be permitted when the acts are extensive and continuous. In
Rowles' opinion, a single, one-time attack would not amount to an armed

46. Id. art. 2.
47. Id. art. 3.
48. Id. art. 4.

49. See infra Part V (for an extensive discussion).
50. James P. Rowles, Military Responses to Terrorism: Substantive and Procedural
Constraints in International Law, 81 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 307, 314 (1987).
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attack which would justify the use of force."' Cassese offers another
definition: an armed attack is a serious attack, which is not one-time,
against the territory of a state or its citizens as such. 2 Such an attack
would only justify the use of force on grounds of self-defense if all
attempts at peaceful resolution have been exhausted. 5"
The United States has interpreted article 51 as including three
possibilities of self-defense:
1. Self-defense in the face of the real use of force or hostile actions.
2. Self-defense as a preventive action in the face of immediate activities
where it is anticipated that force will be used.
3. Self-defense in the face of a persistent threat. 4
Such an interpretation reflects a balance between the broad and narrow
interpretations. The first alternative concerns the situation of an actual
attack which falls within the narrow definition given to armed attacks. The
second situation expands the definition to situations where the attacks have
not yet actually taken place but there is an expectation that they will occur.
The third situation is compatible with the broader interpretation, whereby
the armed attack also embraces situations where the attack has not yet
occurred but there is a persistent and continuing (as opposed to one-time)
threat of the occurrence of an armed attack.
It is immaterial what interpretation is adopted by the state under attack
in order to justify its acts as self-defense. It must immediately inform the
U.N. Security Council of its actions, and the latter will take all steps to
preserve international peace. The U.N. Security Council may decide that
self-defense is indeed needed or, on the contrary, that there is no need for
such action. In the latter case, the state seeking to engage in self-defense
becomes a state acting in an aggressive manner and must immediately
desist from further actions of this type."

51.

Id.

52. Antonio Cassese, The InternationalCommunity's "Legal" Response to Terrorism, 38
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 589, 589 (1989).
53. Id.
54. See Boyd M. Johnson III, Executive Order 12,333: The Permissibilityof an American

Assassinationof a Foreign Leader,25 CORNELLINT'LL.J. 401,420 (1992), quotedinJami Melissa
Jackson, The Legality of Assassination of Independent Terrorist Leaders: An Examination of
Nationaland InternationalImplications, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 669, 683 (1999).

55. DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 70.
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IV. THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON COMBATANT PARTIES

We have seen that the prohibitions on the use of force and on the resort
to war are not absolute. International law enables a state to declare a
defensive war for the purposes of self-defense. However, even when a
state is legally entitled to participate in such a war, there are restrictions on
the nature and extent of the armed force which it may exercise. The laws
of war are based on a balance and compromise between military needs, on
one hand, and humanitarian considerations, on the other. The purpose
behind this balance is to reduce the suffering caused by war. Article 22 of
the Hague Regulations, for example, establishes the general principle that
belligerents do not have an unlimited right to use whatever means they
wish to injure the enemy.56
In this section, we shall specify the central restrictions issuing from this
principle - the restrictions concerning assuring the safety of the civilian
population, restrictions concerning the use of various types of weapons
and ammunition, restrictions concerning the treatment of the combatants
themselves and restrictions ensuing from humanitarian law.
A. Restrictions Concerningthe Safety of Non-CombatantsCivilian Population

The

The first Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War establishes a basic rule
requiring a distinction to be drawn between combatants and civilians, and
between military.purposes and civilian purposes.
Article 50 of the Protocol defines a civilian as any person who does not
belong to the armed forces.5" Civilians are protected in cases of military
conflicts, and there is a prohibition against attacking civilian targets and
civilians.5 9 The combatants must preclude any possibility of damage or
suffering being caused to the civilian population. The prohibition on
attacking civilians and civilian property includes all acts of violence,
whether performed by way of attack or in self-defense. Attacks or threats
of violence which are intended to spread terror among the civilian

56. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annex to Hague
Convention [No. IV] Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 22, 36
Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
57. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of the Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 48, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter First Protocol].
58. Id. art. 50.
59. Id. art. 51.
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population are also prohibited. Article 51 establishes a prohibition on
indiscriminate attacks, namely "(a) those which are not directed at a
specific military objective; (b) those which employ a method or means of
combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or (c)
those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which
cannot be limited" as the Protocol requires, i.e., where the injury to
civilians and to civilian targets is excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated. 60
Article 51 further prohibits "an attack by bombardment by any methods
or means which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly
separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or
other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian
objects."' 6' From Article 51 it is possible to conclude that when the military
targets are not differentiated from each other in a clear manner, or there is
no concentration of civilian targets as described in the wording of the
article, it is possible to relate to an entire region as a single large military
target. This is a significant erosion of the formerly absolute protection
given to civilians. "It appears from Art. 51 that protection of civilians is far
from full ... the battle zone is expanding and the number of civilians
being drawn into the circle of fire is growing."62
Article 52 defines the term "military objectives" as "objects which by
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite
military advantage., 63 In order to implement the rules for the protection of
civilians and their property, those planning or deciding upon an attack
must take a number of precautions. Article 57 of the Protocol provides that
these persons must do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to
be attacked are military objectives and that it is not prohibited by the
provisions of the Protocol to attack them, take all feasible precautions with
a view to avoiding or minimizing damage to civilian objects, and to refrain
from indiscriminate attacks.' An attack must "be cancelled or suspended

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. DiNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 142.

63. First Protocol, supra note 57, art. 52.
64. Id. art. 57.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss4/1
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if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one."65
Additionally, advance warning must be given when attacks may affect
civilians, unless circumstances preclude such warning.'
Article 58 requires that the parties take all feasible steps to "avoid
locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas," and
requires them to take precautions to protect their civilian populations from
military dangers.67 Within the framework of the restrictions concerning
preserving the welfare of the civilian population, a number of specific
objects must be protected from attack. These protected objects 68include
"towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended.
Article 59 of the Additional Protocol reiterates this rule and adds that
"[tihe appropriate authorities of a party to the conflict may declare as a
non-defended locality any inhabited place near or in a zone where armed
forces are in contact which is open for occupation by an adverse party.' 69
These declarations are binding against adverse parties even if made
unilaterally. So long as the circumstances permitting a locality to be
designated non-defended continue to prevail, no attack may be made
against such a locality.
Article 27 of the Hague Regulations refers to hospitals and other
medical centers, and provides that "[iun sieges and bombardments all
necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible.., hospitals, and
places where the sick and wounded are collected. 70 Article 19 of the First
Geneva Convention provides that "[flixed establishments and mobile
medical units of the Medical Service may in no circumstances be
attacked."7 ' Reference here is to hospitals, medical storages, places where
the sick and wounded are collected, ambulances and the like, so long as
they belong to the medical corps - the army. The Fourth Geneva
Convention deals with the protection of civilian hospitals. Article 18
provides that "[clivilian hospitals organized to give care to the wounded
and sick, the infirm and maternity cases, may in no circumstances be the

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. art. 58.
68. Hague Regulations, supra note 56, art. 25.
69. First Protocol, supra note 57, art. 59. This article provides that such a locality must meet
the following conditions: (a) all combatants and all moveable weapons and moveable military
equipment must be vacated from there; (b) no hostile use may be made of permanent military
facilities or buildings; (c) the authorities and the population are prohibited from engaging in hostile

activities; (d) no actions may be taken in support of military activities. Id.
70. Hague Regulations, supra note 56, art. 27.
71. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 19, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
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object of attack. 7' The Additional Protocol, which prohibits attacks on
both military and civilian medical units, adds in article 12 that this is
conditional upon the civilian medical units belonging to one of the
combatant parties and being recognized and authorized by one party's
competent authority.73
Article 54 of the Additional Protocol is concerned with the protection
of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. The
article prohibits the attack, destruction, removal, or rendering useless of
"objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population ... for the
specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian
population. 74 In other words, the purpose is to prohibit the attack of these
objects in order to prevent civilians from being starved out. This provision,
therefore, does not apply when the objects serve the armed forces. The
Additional Protocol also prohibits attacks on facilities which are intended
for civil defense. Civil defense is defined in article 61 of the Protocol as
the performance of "humanitarian tasks intended to protect the civilian
population against the dangers, and to help it to recover from the
immediate effects, of hostilities or disasters and also to provide the
conditions necessary for its survival. 75
These three sets of documents - the Hague Conventions, Geneva
Conventions, and Additional Protocol to the Fourth Geneva Convention
make it unequivocally clear that civilian objects are not legitimate targets
for attack. It should be pointed out that there are additional places which
are not legitimate targets of attack, such as cultural property 6 and places
of worship.77
B. Restrictions Concerning the Use of Types of
Weapons and Ammunition
In the modem age, there is a wide variety of weaponry and
ammunition, and various countries continue to engage in the development
of new means of warfare. From a legal point of view, two general rules
apply to the use of weapons. On one hand, each belligerent party is entitled
to make use of the currently existing weapons at his disposal, and

72. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, art. 18, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
73. First Protocol, supra note 57, art. 12.
74. Id. art. 54.
75. Id. art. 61.
76. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May
14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240.
77. Hague Regulations, supranote 56, art. 27.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss4/1
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introduce new and unrecognized weapons into battle. On the other hand,
it is prohibited to use weapons which unnecessarily increase the suffering
of those injured or make their death a certainty.7 8
Article 23(e) of the Hague Regulations prohibits the employment of
"arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. '79
The Additional Protocol of 1977 to the Fourth Geneva Convention also
prohibits the employment of "weapons, projectiles and material and
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering," and indeed even requires that this prohibition be taken into
account when developing or acquiring new weapons.8 ° It is accepted that
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering must be measured in relation
to the military advantage ensuing from them. In other words, When the
injury or suffering is not proportional to the military advantage which may
be achieved by using the weapon, the outcome is unnecessary suffering.
and not on the
The emphasis is on the objective nature of the weapon,
l
subjective intention of the persons making use of it.8
There are defined situations in the laws of war where the use of specific
types of weapons is prohibited.
I.The Hague Conference of 1899 prohibited the use of "dum-dum"
82
bullets, bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body.
2. Article 23(a) of the Hague Regulations prohibits the use of poison or
poisoned weapons. 3 The prohibition is primarily concerned with the
poisoning of drinking water and food and is part of customary
international law.
3. The Hague Conference of 1889 drafted a declaration, in the nature of
an agreement, which prohibits "the use of projectiles the sole ob ect of
which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases." The
Geneva Conventions also prohibit "the use in war of asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases" as well as biological materials or devices,

78. DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 127.

79. Hague Regulations, supra note 56, art. 23.
80. First Protocol, supra note 57, arts. 35-36.
81. DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 127.
82. Hague DeclarationConcerningExpandingBullets ofJuly 29, 1899, 1 AM.J.INT'LL. 155
(1907).
83. Hague Regulations, supra note 56, art. 23(a).

84. Hague Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899,26 Martens Nouveau
Recueil (2d) 998.
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and the Additional Protocol of 1925 transforms this prohibition into
universal international law. 5
4. The Additional Protocol of 1925 also expands the prohibition on the
use of gases and biological materials to the use of bacteriological
weapons. All biological or bacteriological agents of warfare - living
organisms - "which are intended to cause disease or death in man,
animals or plants" are prohibited. 6 Additionally, a 1972 convention
prohibits the development, creation, and stockpiling of bacteriological
and toxin weapons.
5. In 1976, the U.N. General Assembly decided in a convention to
prohibit the military or other hostile use of environmental modification
techniques. The convention provides that the parties are prohibited
from using techniques having widespread, serious or prolonged impact
which may have the effect of modifying the ecology. 88
Today, a problem has arisen in relation to the use of nuclear weapons.
There is no express treaty provision which unequivocally prohibits the use
of non-conventional nuclear weapons. There are those who believe that in
the light of the general restriction in the Hague Convention in relation to
the employment of weapons causing unnecessary suffering, the use of
nuclear weapons is also prohibited. 89 Such weapons are different from
conventional weapons in terms of both quantity and quality. Apart from
the enormous explosion generated, the effects of which are felt far from
the center of the explosion, nuclear weapons cause huge loss of life and
suffering which greatly exceeds what is necessary to destroy a specific
military target. On the other hand, there are those who contend that there
may be cases where the damage and suffering caused by nuclear weapons
are proportional to the military advantage ensuing from them. The U.S.

85. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925,26 U.S.T. 571,94 L.N.T.S. 65.
86. R.R. Baxter & Thomas Buergenthal, Legal Aspectsof the Geneva Protocol of 1925, 64

AM. J.INT'LL. 853, 868 (1970).
87. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26
U.S.T. 583.
88. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, Dec. 10, 1976, 31 U.S.T. 333.
89. See Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles offHumanity, and Dictates ofPublic
Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 87-88 (2000).
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action in dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki led to the
swift surrender of Japan and the saving of many lives that would have
been lost had the war continued. 9°
C. Restrictions Concerning the Combatants Themselves
We have already noted the distinction between combatants and
civilians in the laws of war. War must be waged between combatants, and
these must refrain insofar as possible from injury to civilians. Usually, it
is the combatants who are exposed to the dangers of war. The Geneva
Conventions afford protection to combatants who are captured by the
enemy and become prisoners of war. The guiding principle in the first
three Geneva Conventions of 1949 is that there is a duty to keep prisoners
of war alive and in good health, without injury or cruel treatment, although
they may be kept in a prisoner of war camp. 9' Article 4 of the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War sets out eight
categories of persons entitled to the status of prisoners of war.92 The
Additional Protocol of 1977 adds freedom fighters.93
The guiding principle is that "[p]risoners of war must at all times be
humanely treated."' They "are entitled in all circumstances to respect for
their persons and their honour."95 They must be protected against acts of
96
violence and fear, as well as from insult and public curiosity.
Accordingly, it is prohibited to conduct parades of prisoners of war and
they must not be coerced into making announcements to the media. 97
Following capture, the prisoners of war must be evacuated from the
combat zone to camps which are outside the danger area. Only wounded
prisoners who would be endangered by evacuation may be kept in a danger
zone, and then only temporarily. 9 In addition, "[t]he evacuation of
prisoners of war shall always be effected humanely."'99 If they may not be
taken out of the danger zone in accordance with the provisions of the Third

90. Ellery C. Stowell, The Laws of War and the Atomic Bomb, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 786
(1945).
91. DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 95.
92. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
93. See First Protocol, supra note 57, art. 43.
94. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 92, art. 13.
95. Id. art. 14.
96. Id. art. 13.
97. DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 114.
98. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 92, art. 19.

99. Id. art. 20.
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Geneva Convention, the Additional Protocol requires that they be
released.' 0
A detaining power may not keep secret the identity of prisoners of war;
it may not cause their death, endanger their health, mutilate them, or use
them for medical or scientific experiments.'0 ' Article 11 of the Additional
Protocol of 1977 prohibits endangering the life or physical or mental wellbeing of prisoners of war by unjustified acts or omissions.'O° Article 17 of
the Third Geneva Convention provides that a prisoner of war need only
give his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and serial number,
and any form of coercion to secure additional information about himself
or about his army is absolutely prohibited. 3 There is a prohibition °4on
torture, threats and insults intended to secure additional information.
Prisoners of war must be provided with food rations of sufficient
"quantity, quality and variety to keep [them] in good health" and account
must be taken of their habitual diet.0" Sufficient clothing and footwear
must be supplied." The health of the prisoners must be maintained by
ensuring general hygiene, the establishment of infirmaries and personal
medical treatment.'0 7 Prisoners of war must be allowed to exercise their
religions freely and be allowed educational, entertainment, and sporting
activities.'0 8 There is a prohibition on leaving prisoners of war without
identifying documents, and money and valuables may be removed for safe
custody only. 19 There is also a prohibition on judging prisoners of war for
acts committed during the course of the fighting. "0
Prisoners must be released without delay at the end of active
hostilities."' This duty applies to both healthy and wounded prisoners of
war, irrespective of their numbers or ranks. It is important to note that the
100. First Protocol, supra note 57, art. 41(3).
101. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 92, art. 13.
102. First Protocol, supra note 57, art. 11. In particular it is forbidden to engage in medical

procedures which are not required by the health of the prisoners of war, and which are not
compatible with accepted medical standards which would have been applied in similar
circumstances to free nationals of the detaining state. Id.
103. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 92, art. 17.
104. Id.
105. Id. arts. 26-29.
106. Id. art. 27.
107. Id. arts. 29-31.

108. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 92, arts. 34, 38.
109. Id. art. 18 (They must be allowed to retain their personal possessions, apart from
weapons, military equipment and military documents. Items having personal or spiritual value (e.g.,

medals) must not be taken away from the prisoners of war.).
110. First Protocol, supra note 57, art. 75.
111. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 92, art. 118.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss4/1

24

ORGANIZATIONS
STATES AND TERRORIST
WAR WAGED
THE LAWS
20031 Gross:
TheOFLaws
of WarBETWEEN
WagedDEMOCRATIC
Between Democratic
States and
Terrorist Org413

duty to release prisoners without delay upon the cessation of active
hostilities, does not allow the detaining power to wait for the signing of a
peace treaty or even a cease fire agreement. In the absence of an agreement
between the parties, the prisoners must be released unilaterally. In other
words, according to article 118, the duty to release is absolute; the release
must take place upon the termination of fighting and not upon the
termination of the war. Responsibility for the treatment of prisoners is not
imposed on the individual or unit who captured them but rests on the
detaining power, and such responsibility continues from the moment of
capture to the moment of release." 2
D. RestrictionsEnsuingfrom HumanitarianLaw
International humanitarian law is based upon the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949.'3 Common to the four conventions is the nature of
the norms which they seek to establish. The international community has
decided that, while in time of war most human rights are suspended, a
number of such rights are incapable of being suspended. Apart from the
restrictions referred to in relation to weapons and the treatment of
combatants, there are restrictions which issue from humanitarian law.
These restrictions are concerned with the proper treatment of the civilian
population when these people are located within the territory of the enemy.
The Hague Regulations of 1907, in relating to nationals of the hostile
party per se (in occupied territories or in the territory of a belligerent),
prohibit a belligerent from declaring the rights and actions of enemy
nationals to be destroyed, suspended or inadmissible.' 4 Likewise, a
belligerent is "forbidden to compel the nationals of the hostile party to take
part in the operations of war directed against their own country.'. 5 The
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 is broader, dealing with classes apart
from only enemy nationals. 6 Article 73 of the Additional Protocol of

112. Id. art. 5.
113. DINsTrEN, supra note 7, at 22.

114. Hague Regulations, supra note 56, art. 23(h).
115.

Id.

116. Fourth Geneva Convention, supranote 72, art. 4. The provision deals with persons who
find themselves in the hands of a party to the conflict without being (a) nationals of that party, (b)
nationals of a state which is not bound by the Convention, (c) nationals of a neutral state which
maintains normal diplomatic representation in the state in whose hands they are, (d) nationals of
a cobelligerent state which maintains such representation, and (e) persons protected by the other
three Geneva Conventions of 1949 (such as medical personnel); in terms of this convention,
however, only the first class is protected. Id.
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1977 provides that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to all "[p]ersons
who, before the beginning of hostilities, were considered as stateless
persons or refugees."" 7
At the same time, article 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides
that a protected person may not exercise the rights the Convention
guarantees if they are in the territory of a state which is at war, that state
suspects them of hostilities, and the exercise of their rights would threaten
the security of that state." 8 Nonetheless, under this article, the state must
continue to treat the individual in a humanitarian manner." 9 In the case of
trial, the individual will be entitled to fair and regular proceedings. 20
Humanitarian law requires that these people too be treated with a
minimum level of respect.
The provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention express the
humanitarian considerations which were taken into account when the laws
of war were being shaped, and the necessary balance between these
considerations and the military needs of the combatants. The convention
guarantees that
[p]rotected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for
their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious
convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They
shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected
especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against
insults and public curiosity. Women shall be especially protected
against any attack on their honour, and in particular against rape,
enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.... [These
duties must be observed] without any adverse distinction based...
on race, religion or political opinion. However, the Parties to the
conflict may take such measures of control and security in regard
2
to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war.' '
The signatories are prohibited from using coercion against protected
persons, specifically to obtain information. 22 The parties are prohibited
from engaging in "murder, torture, corporal punishments, mutilation and

117. First Protocol, supra note 57, art. 73.
118. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 72, art. 5.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. art. 27.

122. Id. art. 31.
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medical or scientific experiments."' 123 Nor may they punish protected
individuals for offenses those individuals did not commit.' 24 Additionally,
"[c]ollective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of
terrorism are prohibited" as are "[rieprisals against protected persons and
26
their property."'125 Finally, Article 34 prohibits the taking of hostages.

Additional restrictions exist concerning the civilian population. 2
Common to all is the humane treatment which must be given to every
human being. Likewise, many restrictions are imposed on an occupying
power in relation
to its treatment of the population living in the occupied
2
territories.

1

In this section, we have set out some of the multiple constraints
applicable to a combatant. These restrictions were formulated within the
interstate framework (the Hague and Geneva Conventions) and issue both
from treaty law and customary international law. We shall now turn to the
situation where only one combatant, a state, regards itself as subject to
these constraints, whereas the other party, an organization which is not a
state but is a terrorist organization, not only does not see itself as subject
to these constraints, but chooses to breach them.
E. Restraintof CombatantsInapplicableto Terrorists
We have described the difficulty involved in asserting self-defense
within a framework where the players are not states but rather a state and
a terrorist organization. If we subscribe to the approach that a state also has
the right to self-defense in cases where the hostile party is not a state but
is a terrorist organization, we must contend with a new difficulty. We have
seen the various constraints imposed on combatants. Do these constraints
continue to apply when a state exercises its right to self-defense against a
terrorist organization?
The normative sources of international law deal with interstate
relations. The system operates on a reciprocal basis whereby each party
accepts the constraints imposed by the laws of war. Each party accepts the
range of restrictive rules on the understanding that there is a moral code to
the effect that war is bad, even if on occasion necessary for purposes of
self-defense. Even where there is no choice but to engage in war, restraints
123. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 72,art. 32.

124. Id.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. art. 33.
Id. art. 34.
See, e.g., First Protocol, supra note 57, arts. 77-78.
See, e.g., Hague Regulations, supra note 56, art. 46; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra

note 72, art. 55; First Protocol, supra note 57, art. 69.
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must be imposed on the use of force and the weapons employed against
the other side. The possibility of reacting with armed force is not
equivalent to the possibility of reacting in an unfettered manner in order
to achieve one's objectives. In a war waged by a state against a terrorist
organization the state sees itself as constrained by the laws of war, whereas
the terrorist organization does not see itself as subject to the same
restrictions. For the terrorist organization the exercise of armed force is not
a means of achieving an objective but an objective in itself and therefore
one without boundaries. Terrorism, by definition, operates against an
innocent civilian population and not against the military forces of the state.
What, then, will be the fate of the laws of war? Will they continue to bind
the state which must fight entities which do not recognize such laws?
There are those who believe that when a war is being fought in
circumstances other than between two states, it is not possible for these
rules to continue to apply. In the words of one commentator, "[t]o declare
terrorism to be the war of the future is to imply that traditional forms of
interstate warfare are soon to be extinct, or at least, very rare.'' 29
Our goal is to determine whether the laws of war continue to apply in
these special circumstances. In order to answer this question it is first
necessary to define the status of terrorists in international law: are they
combatants or civilians, and if neither, how should the war against them
be conducted?
F. The Status of Terrorists in InternationalLaw
International law distinguishes between those who take an active part
in the fighting and those who do not. The Geneva Conventions maintain
the same distinction. A person who takes an active part in the fighting and
is a member of the armed forces of the state is a combatant. Civilians, as
we have seen, are protected in times of war. The participating states must
refrain from any step likely to cause harm or suffering to the civilian
population. The Geneva Conventions provide protection to combatants
who are captured by the enemy in times of war. This protection is provided
to lawful combatants only.
Apart from the distinction between civilians and combatants, a
distinction exists between lawful and unlawful combatants. The rule is that
only lawful combatants are entitled to the status of prisoners of war. In
contrast, unlawful combatants may be placed on trial and punished with
all the weight of the law. So long as a person is a lawful combatant, the
laws of war prohibit placing him on trial for his actions and he is regarded

,129. Waxman, supra note 4, at 208.
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as a prisoner of war. The purpose of the distinction between lawful and
unlawful combatants is to preserve the distinction between combatants and
civilians. If combatants were able to disappear within the civilian
population, every civilian within that population would be suspected of
being a hidden combatant and would suffer the inevitable consequences.
In order to remove civilians from the battle arena, sanctions must be
imposed on those attempting to exploit the distinction and thereby
endangering it. A person is not entitled to claim two capacities at once to be a civilian and to engage in military activities. Such a person is not a
civilian and is also not a soldier, he is an unlawful combatant who does not
enjoy the privileges of a prisoner of war and is subject to ordinary criminal
sanctions. 3
The definition of combatants may be found in article 4 of the Geneva
Convention of 1949:
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are
persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have
fallen into the power of the enemy:
(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)

Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as
well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part
of such armed forces.
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer
corps, including those of organized resistance movements,
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or
outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied,
provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such
organized resistance movements, fulfill the following
conditions: (a) That of being commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates; (b) That of having a fixed
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) That of
carrying arms openly; (d) That ofconducting their operations
in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to
a government or an authority not recognized by the
Detaining Power.
Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually
being members thereof, such as civilian members of military
aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors,

130. DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 97.
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members of labor units or of services responsible for the
welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received
authorization from the armed forces which they accompany,
who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card
similar to the annexed model.
Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices,
of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the
Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favorable
treatment under any other provisions of international law.
Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach
of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the
invading forces, without having had time to form themselves
into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly
and respect the laws and customs of war.

B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under
the present Convention:
Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces
(1)
of the occupied country, if the occupying Power considers it
necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even
thought it has originally liberated them while hostilities were
going on outside the territory it occupies, in particular where
such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin
the armed forces to which they belong and which are
engaged 'in combat, or where they fail to comply with a
summons made to them with a view to internment.
(2)
The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated
in the present Article, who have been received by neutral or
non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom these
Powers are required to intern under international law,
without prejudice to any more favorable treatment which
these Powers may choose to give and with the exception of
Articles 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and,
where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the
conflict and the neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned
those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where such
diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom
these persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards
them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the
present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which
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these Parties normally exercise in conformity with
diplomatic and consular usage and treaties. 3 '
The Geneva Conventions do not refer to the status of civilians who do
not fall within the definition of combatants but still take an active part in
the fighting. The Geneva Conventions do, however, refer to a new term:
freedom fighters. Recognition of freedom and liberation movements in
international law sprang from the phenomenon of colonialism. The law
recognized the need felt by civilians under occupation to obtain
independence, freedom, and self-determination. The path to this goal
entailed acts of war and the law was willing to provide protection to this
class of fighters.
The First Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 expands the
protection afforded by the Geneva Conventions to combatants, and also
offers this protection to freedom fighters, fighters who are not part of the
official armed forces of the state, but are still considered lawful
combatants. 3 2 The recognition given by the Geneva Conventions to the
new class of combatants is intended to give them the protection of
prisoners of war.133 The First Protocol makes entitlement to this protection
contingent upon the fighters acknowledging themselves
to be bound by the
134
rules applicable to combatants in international law.
This condition is compatible with article 4(2)(d) of the Third Geneva
Convention, which provides that one of the conditions which must be
satisfied before persons will be recognized as being prisoners of war is
"that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war."' 35 In addition, the party including within its armed forces
other armed groups who provide assistance must notify the other parties
131. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 92, art. 4.

132. First Protocol, supra note 57, art. 43. Article 43 provides:
The armed forces of a party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces,
groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the

conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or
an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be
subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce
compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.
Id.
133. JUDITH GAIL GARDAM, NON-COMBATANT IMMUNITY AS A NORM OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 56 (1933).
134. First Protocol, supra note 57, art. 43. 1: ... inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict."
135. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 92, art. 4(2)(d).
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to the conflict of the same. 136 This is a necessary precondition for these
persons to be recognized as combatants within the framework of the
Geneva Conventions and thereby become entitled to the protection
available to prisoners of war.
It should be pointed out that the Hague Regulations recognized that the
rights and obligations of war did not apply only to armies but also to
militia and volunteer corps which did not form part of the army.'37
However, in order for these fighters to be entitled to rights they had: "(1)
[t]o be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (2) [t]o
have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; (3) [t]o carry
arms openly; and (4) [t]o conduct
their operations in accordance with the
138
war.
of
customs
and
laws
The Geneva Conventions reiterate these conditions and adds the
condition of organization and affiliation to a combatant party.139 This
recognition of freedom fighters preserves the principle of reciprocity
which underlies the rules restraining the parties in time of war. An
essential condition that has to be met in order to obtain the status of a
freedom fighter is compliance with the rules of international law.
Notwithstanding that the opposing parties are not two states, but rather a
state and an organization of people, namely freedom fighters, the principle
of reciprocity is maintained. Both sides are subject to the rules of
international law and comply with them. Alongside this development and
the recognition accorded to freedom fighters, a new development has seen
terrorist organizations begin organizing for the purpose of creating a new
world order. Are these terrorists really freedom fighters?
The answer to this is an unequivocal no! To fight for freedom means
to fight against oppression, to fight against the violation of human rights.
The clear conclusion is that terrorists who themselves violate human
rights, and in particular the right to life, can never be freedom fighters.
It should be noted that the First Protocol to the Geneva Conventions
establishes a number of requirements which must be met before civilians
will be recognized as freedom fighters, such as the requirements that these
freedom fighters refrain from intermingling with the civilian population,
that they wear uniforms or other recognizable means of identification, and

136. First Protocol, supra note 57, art. 43(3): "Whenever a party to a conflict incorporates a
paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency into its armed forces it shall so notify the other
Parties to the conflict."
137. Hague Regulations, supranote 56.
138. Id. art. 1.
139. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 92,art. 4.
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that they carry their weapons openly. " Underlying these requirements is
the need to distinguish fighters from the protected civilian population so
as to ensure that the parties to the conflict know against whom they are
fighting and that civilians who are not combatants will not be endangered.
One of the most destructive consequences of terror is the obfuscation
which it engenders in relation to the distinction between combatants and
civilians. The terrorists carry out their attacks from the heart of population
centers which serve as shelters for them, in the knowledge that the state
fighting them will not target these population centers. Terrorists infringe
the rules of international law. They do not act openly, and their primary
purpose is to deliberately attack innocent civilians.
The greatest danger is that the humanist principles which underlie the
rules of international law in relation to the protection of the innocent will
be replaced by the conferral of protection on terrorists. Article 44(3) of the
Protocol, for example, recognizes an exception to the requirement that the
combatants distinguish themselves from the civilian population, and
preserves the status of the combatant even in cases where he does not
distinguish himself from the civilian population but carries his weapons
openly. 41 Israel, the United States, and Britain have all refused to sign the
First Protocol of 1977. The reason for their refusal is the fact that the
Protocol expands the definition of combatants to embrace freedom fighters
who are entitled to the rights that the Convention grants to combatants.
Israel and the United States feared that terrorist organizations would be
recognized as combatants, under the definition of freedom fighters, and by
virtue of this recognition become entitled to the rights of prisoners of war.
Terrorists are not entitled to the status of combatants. Professor Frits
Kalshoven explained why it is inconceivable that terrorists be entitled to
the status of combatants:
In these circumstances, a simple statement that the law of armed
conflict is applicable to terrorists seems of little practical utility.
Who would be bound by such an instrument, and to what effect?
Would, for instance, the authorities acquire any additional legal
powers that they do not already possess under their constitutional

140. First Protocol, supra note 57, art. 44.3: "In order to promote the protection of the civilian
population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from
the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory
to an attack."
141. "Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the
nature of the hostilities an armed combatant, cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status
as a combatant." Id.
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provisions? Would they become bound to respect any special rights
of terrorists not ensuing from existing human rights instruments?
Again, are we to assume that terrorists must respect the law of
armed conflict - with its express prohibition on acts of terror? Or
that they would become entitled to a special status upon capture a status that governments rejected even for an internal armed
conflict? All these questions are purely rhetorical. In other words,
my answer to the question of whether the laws of war should be
made applicable to the activities of terrorists in situations where
they are at present inapplicable is: No. 42
Others assert that terrorists do not meet any of the requirements of
combatants in international law nor do they meet the requirements of
freedom fighters:
[L]awful combatants must be organized under a responsible
command, must be subject to an internal disciplinary system to
enforce compliance with international law applicable in armed
conflict (such as the rules protecting civilians from indiscriminate
attacks) and must bear arms openly during military deployment and
engagement. A casually attired driver of a van carrying a concealed
43
bomb does not fit anyone's definition of a lawful combatant.
I agree with the view that holds that terrorist organizations cannot be
regarded as combatants. Currently, terrorists are principally people who do
not regard themselves as subject to legal constraints. They do not balk at
any measures which they believe will further their cause, namely,
achieving a new world order, with many groups espousing an extreme
Islamic militant ideology which seeks to revive the glory of Islam and

142. Frits Kalshoven, Should the Law of WarApply to Terrorists?, 79 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. 109, 118 (1985).
143. Spencer J.Crona & Neal A. Richardson, Justice for War Criminals of Invisible Armies:
A New Legal and Military Approach to Terrorism, 21 OKLA. CITy U. L. REV. 349, 366 (1996)
(citations omitted).
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dominate the world. For this purpose, terrorists are willing to risk their
lives and injure their opponents by any means available:
Their anger is directed not only against a political system, but
against social and cultural ones as well. Their protest is general, and
so are the targets of their attacks. In the past, terrorist's targets were
often political or military, and civilian victims were merely caught
in the crossfire. Today, however, indiscriminate killing appears to
be the goal rather than the byproduct of terrorism. Everyone is a
potential target. Moreover, terrorists have no scruples as to how
many people they kill or maim.'"
Is it conceivable that the law will protect this class of combatants and this
type of warfare? So long as terrorists do not respect the restraining rules
which international law imposes in times of war, there is no reason for
international law to respect them, protect them and acknowledge them as
combatants.
Are terrorists entitled to the status of civilians? The definition of the
term civilians or civilian population appears in article 50 of the First
Protocol of 1977 to the Geneva Convention:
1. A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the
categories of persons referred to in Article 4 (A)(1), (2), (3) and (6)
of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In case
of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be
considered to be a civilian.
2. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians.
3. The presence within the civilian population of individuals who
do not come within the definition of45civilians does not deprive the
population of its civilian character.'
Prima facie, it would seem from this definition that any person who does
not fall within the category of combatants, or even one whose status is

144. Waxman, supra note 4, at 202-03.
145. First Protocol, supra note 57, art. 50.
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doubtful, must be deemed to be a civilian. However, in my opinion it
would not be appropriate to interpret the article in this way. We are not
trying to define the status of innocent civilians or examine the status of a
person who is perhaps the citizen of another state; rather we are discussing
terrorists. As we have seen, the defenses granted to civilians during the
course of war are much broader than the defenses granted to combatants.
Terrorist activities have been defined in many ways. While no single
international definition has yet been formulated, there is one common
denominator to all these definitions, and that is the use or threat of use of
violence against civilians." It is inconceivable that the drafters of the
Conventions intended to confer protection which corresponds to the broad
protection given to civilians in international law on those committing
terrorist attacks.
In short, international law has not yet clearly regulated the status of
terrorists. If they are not combatants and not freedom fighters, they are
also not civilians. How should a state which is a party in the fight against
terror contend with that terror? The principle of reciprocity in relation to
the constraining rules is preserved when the conflict is between two states
or between a state and an organization of freedom fighters. In both those
cases the players obey the rules of international law. Today we are dealing
with a different case, where the principle of reciprocity no longer applies
and compliance with the constraining rules is, at the most, one sided. This
is one of the most problematic aspects of the war against terror: "[t]he
broader and more fundamental challenge.., is to reconcile the necessity
of combating terrorism147
with the constitutional, legal and ethical demands
state."'
democratic
a
of
Following the terrorist attack against the United States, B. Welling Hall
explained:
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center... on September
11, 2001 pose the legal dilemma of how to respond proportionally
when the initial attack was itself unreasonable, excessive, and
against civilians. Nonetheless, the suggested policy of holding
entire nations accountable for the acts of a few would not appear to

146. See, e.g., English Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, § 20,
availableathttp://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts 1989/Ukpgaj 9890004_en_l.htm (last visited Apr.
15,2003) (defines the term "terrorism": "[T]errorism' means the use of violence for political ends,
and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public
in fear.").
147. Waxman, supra note 4, at 206.
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be lawful since collective punishment would, by definition,
entail
48
the unnecessary suffering of innocent populations.
Will a democratic state continue to be bound by the constraining rules
notwithstanding that the enemy does not see itself as similarly bound by
them, but attacks unlawful targets and ignores the constraints relating to
the safety of non-combatant parties? What if such an enemy ignores the
constraints relating to the use of weapons and ammunition and threatens
to use biological weapons? What if the enemy does not recognize the
language of humanitarian law which prohibits it from causing unnecessary
suffering?
Will, for example, a state refrain from attacking a population center
notwithstanding that terrorist organizations are positioned in that location
and thereby use the laws of war for their own benefit? There are those who
believe that while each state is subject to the obligation to refrain from
injuring civilians, no international rule prohibits it from striking a target
merely because civilians might be injured: "[w]hile each nation is under
an obligation to conduct military operations in a manner which minimizes
damage to civilians, no international rule exists which obligates a nation
to forego a legitimate military target simply because injury to civilian
personnel might take place."' 49
Indeed, in every war civilians are hurt. The war against terror is no
different: "[i]n every war civilians are caught
in the crossfire, and a war
50
against terrorism will not be an exception."'
Will terrorist organizations always be protected against attack in the
light of the fact that they are located within population centers? This would
clearly grant them an enormous advantage, amounting almost to immunity
from attack. Is this conceivable? Can they not be targeted, even though
doing so might involve collateral injury to civilians?
In order to investigate the answers to these questions, it is first
necessary to consider whether it is conceivable to permit a democratic
state to act in the same manner as its enemy and discard all the restraints
imposed on it by the laws of war. The answer to this preliminary question
is no. If such permission was granted, the result would be that the party
fighting terrorism would itself become a terrorist entity. The goal is to end

148. B. Welling Hall, ASIL Insights: Addendum Relating to Self-Defense, available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
149. Gregory F. Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An InternationalLegal Analysis, 19
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 177, 211 (1987), quoted in Beck & Arend, supra note 31, at 210.
150. Waxman, supra note 4, at 206.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

37

FLORIDA
JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL
Florida Journal of
International
Law,
Vol. 15, Iss.
4 [2003], Art. 1
LAW

JVol. 15

terrorism and not increase the number of participants in it. This is the
principal reason for the demand made on democratic states to remain
subject to all the constraints discussed above. Literature on terrorism refers
to the lawful reactions to terrorism; in other words, there is no doubt that
a democratic state fighting
terror must always "meet the conditions of any
'5
lawful use of force."' '
In Israel, President of the Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak has
explained:
It is the fate of democracy that it does not see all means as justified,
and not all the methods adopted by its enemies are open to it. On
occasion, democracy fights with one hand tied. Nonetheless, the
reach of democracy is superior, as safeguarding the rule of law and
recognition of the freedoms of the individual, are an important
component in its concept of security. Ultimately, they fortify
its
52
spirit and strength and enable it to overcome its problems.1
A democratic state today has one legal basis for fighting terrorism self-defense. As we have seen there are a number of preconditions which
must be met before the right to self-defense may be exercised, including
the existence of necessity and proportionality. The principal significance
of these preconditions is that the use of force becomes limited, balanced,
and considered. The use of force is kept within the boundaries of
humanitarian law:
Self-defense action against terrorism is not exempt from the
humanitarian rules applicable to armed conflict. Thus, the general
prohibition[s] against [targeting] non-combatants or excessive
destruction of civilian property apply. The fact that terrorist bases
are found in the midst of cities, and may therefore be "shielded" by
non-combatants, can give rise to a difficult dilemma. It is
nonetheless desirable to recognize legal as well as moral restraints
relating to non-combatants.t

151. W. Michael Reisman, InternationalLegal Responses to Terrorism,22 HOus. J.INT'LL.

3, 54 (1999).
152. H.C. 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, 53(4)
P.D. 817, 840.
153. Oscar Schachter, The Extra-TerritorialUse of ForceAgainst TerroristsBases, 11 HOuS.
J. INT'LL. 309, 315 (1988).
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At the beginning of the war against terror waged by the United States
against Afghanistan, President Bush emphasized that the war was not
against the Afghan people, but rather against the oppressive Taliban
regime and those who practiced terrorism. 5 4 Nonetheless, when a state
responds on grounds of self-defense, but civilians might be hurt, should a
distinction still be drawn between acts of terror directed against civilians
and the response of self-defense which targets the terrorists yet may cause
collateral damage to civilians? The answer to this is not simple. It is part
of the complex and problematic picture in which terrorists operate from
the midst of population centers, occasionally without the consent and
knowledge of that population, and the victim state is aware that the
perpetrators of the terror have taken shelter among the civilians. If the state
acts against the terrorists in those circumstances and injures civilians, is
that injury accidental? Why should the civilians pay a price?
An imbalance in the exercise of armed force - where the democratic
states which are the victims of terror must respond in a limited, restrained
way, while the other side remains unfettered - cannot lead to the
suppression of terrorism. The solution is not, as noted, to permit states to
respond in a manner similar to that of the terrorists. The solution is also
not for the state to surrender in the face of this situation. It is necessary to
engage in renewed legislation which will impose severe sanctions on any
state that enables terrorists to operate out of its territories and thereby
mingle with its innocent civilian population. An international body must
be set up which will assist states in which terrorists are operating but
which are unable to suppress their activities to fight those terrorists and put
an end to their operations in their or any other territories.
V. THE MORAL CONCEPTS UNDERLYING STATE SELF-DEFENSE

Can a state with a defined geographical area which has fallen victim to
acts of terror react with armed force against those responsible for these
acts when it is an identifiable enemy or organization, but one which does
not necessarily operate out of a clear geographical region? If so, against
whom will the retaliation be directed, and in what circumstances will it be
permitted? The legal perception of self-defense originates in the relations
between men, and has been acknowledged since the beginning of history.
International law has applied this same ideological concept to the relations

154. U.S. Targets Terror, Not Afghan People, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 8, 2001, at A14.
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between states.'55 In the same way as men have a real need to survive and
therefore they are permitted to engage in self-defense, so too states need
the device of self-defense in order to protect their national security, the
safety of the individuals living within their territory, their basic rights and
in particular their right to self-determination. 56 A democratic state is
responsible for the preservation of the civilian infrastructure and for the
preservation of the conditions which enable civilians to enjoy their basic
rights. The central component in this civilian infrastructure is human life.
This is the fundamental condition without which there is nothing and
which must exist before a person can realize his basic rights. Accordingly,
within the framework of the obligation of the state to preserve the civilian
infrastructure, it must defend as best it can the lives of its civilians against
the dangers facing them.' This is the reason why the prohibition on using
force in international law is not an absolute prohibition. Use of force is
permissible where it is being used in self-defense. Here it must be
emphasized that use of force otherwise than in self-defense, for example
in revenge, is not morally justified on grounds of self-defense.' 5 8 Assa
Casher has asserted that the use of force in self-defense is not only
permissible from the point of view of the relations between the army of the
state and the army of59the enemy, but it is part of the moral obligation of a
democratic regime. 1
Does this moral obligation also apply when the army of the enemy is
not an army of a state? Do the provisions of the U.N. Charter, with their
prohibition on the use of armed force except in cases of self-defense, apply
only the relations between states, or do they also apply to all organized
groups of people? The concept of self-defense is understandable in the
context of individuals and in the context of states. It is difficult to apply in
the context of a state and an entity which is not a state. When a state grants
shelter to terrorist organizations located within its territory, and the
targeted state is interested in exercising its right to self-defense against
them, it is easier to understand how the concept of self-defense may be
applied, since in these circumstances the act of the host state itself gives
rise to the right to self-defense against that host state, if not against the

155.

DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 66.

156. Michael F. Lohr, Legal Analysis of U.S. Military Responses to State-Sponsored
InternationalTerrorism, 34 NAVALL. REV. 1, 13 (1985).
157.

ASSA CASHER, MILITARY ETHICS 37-39 (1996).

158. Emanuel Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts by Attacking the Perpetratorsor their
Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense: Human Rights Versus the State's Duty to Protect its
Citizens, 15 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 195, 196 (2001).
159. Lohr, supra note 156, at 54.
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support to the terrorist organizations, when the host state perhaps does not
even know of the existence of these organizations or is unable to eliminate
them, may the right to self-defense be raised against those organizations
alone?
From the point of view of moral justification there is no distinction
between the two cases. So long as the moral justification for the existence
of the right to self-defense is the justification of survival, defense against
extinction, and an organization - an entity which is not a state - is
acting in such an extreme manner towards a state as to endanger its
existence, why should that state not be allowed to protect itself against the
threat?
On occasion, the threat on the part of a terrorist organization is no less
real and tangible than a threat of the same type posed by a state. Moreover,
today, when international terrorist organizations could possess weapons of
mass destruction and they have multiple and firm sources of finance, the
potential threat which they pose to international peace and safety can be
much greater than the threat posed by a single state. The fact that the
enemy is made up of individuals and not an entire state need not prevent
the target state from defending itself. Thus, Spencer J. Corona and Neal A.
Richardson have said: "[tihe fact that the targets of a U.S. military
response may be combatant individuals instead of enemy government
agencies or structures should not preclude [an] 'in-kind' military
'
response."161
In view of the moral logic underlying the right to self-defense, Jordan
Paust explained, following the terrorist attacks against the United States,
that it was irrelevant whether this was war - the right of the United States
to self-defense against the terrorists existed:
In case of an armed attack or process of armed attacks on the
United States, whether or not a war or armed conflict exists, the
targeting of nonstate or state leaders and entities in charge of or
directly engaged in the attack is a permissible measure of selfdefense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.... A selfdefense military mission to capture and arrest those ordering and

161. Crona & Richardson, supra note 143, at 358.
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directly engaged in ongoing processes of attack would also be
permissible under the Charter."'
As Paust makes clear, the moral basis for allowing a state to defend
itself against different classes of enemies - not only states - cannot by
itself justify the taking of self-defense measures. It is necessary to have a
legal statutory basis for such measures. As self-defense is an exception to
the prohibition on war in international law, it may be seen as a counter-war
or defensive war. The relevant question becomes whether it is possible to
exercise the right to a defensive war against a body which is not a state.
The answer to this is found in the definition of war. The accepted legal
definition is that "war is the clash between two or more States, by means
of their armed forces" in other words, the comprehensive use of force in
the relations between two or more states. 163This definition emphasizes that
the warring parties consist of sovereign entities, i.e., states, which deploy
armed forces and the use of them is comprehensive in so far as concerns
targets and measures.' Such a definition may give rise to the claim that
if the use of force is prohibited only in the relations between states, the use
of force is permissible and possible in the relation between states and an
organization which is not a state, such as a terrorist organization. This
claim must be rejected as it contradicts the purposes of the U.N. Charter
namely that the use of force even in cases where the clashing parties are
not states - poses a risk to international peace and security.
Reality has shown that war is no longer confined to states. In the trial
of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and his nine accomplices for terrorist acts
committed in 1993 in the World Trade Center, the United States Attorney65
General opened by saying that "this is a case involving a war."'
We are used to thinking of war as involving hostilities between two
defined states, an identified enemy with clear borders and known military
forces. Victory takes place when geographical areas are conquered or the
enemy submits. We also often see war as a metaphor for the fight against
social and political problems, such as the war against poverty. But we fail
to see the true meaning of the term when it comes to dealing with
terrorism." 6 The war against terrorism is different than war in its

162. Jordan Paust, ASIL Insights: War and Response to Terrorism, available at http://www.
asil.orglinsights/insigh77.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
163. I.L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 337-38, 365 (1955).

164. DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 13-15.
165. Richard Bernstein, Biggest U.S. Terrorist Trial Begins as Arguments Clash, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 1995, at Al.
166. Crona & Richardson, supra note 143 at 359.
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traditional sense. Terror is not an enemy in the same way as a state. It has
no army but it does have militias. It has no tanks or helicopters but it does
have knives and hand grenades. The object is not to vanquish the other
side by occupation or suppression but to spread fear and hatred. The object
is not to injure soldiers but to injure civilians. Accordingly, precise legal
language today ascribes the term war to the use of force or violent conflict
between organized groups of people (and not only to states).' 67 This is a
new war, and indeed the American-led war against terror has been termed
America's New War.
The approach which holds that the U.N. Charter applies to the relations
between states only, so that the right to self-defense is granted to an entity
which is recognized as being a state in accordance with objective criteria
(i.e., a known and defined geographical area and recognition by other
states) and not to relations between other entities which are not states,
gives the U.N. Charter an interpretation which is not compatible with
modem developments. The U.N. Charter must be interpreted in the light
of the various developments in the circumstances of today, in much the
same way as a constitution. The President of the Supreme Court of Israel,
Justice Aharon Barak, has explained in his book Interpretationin Law how
a constitution and constitutional basic rights must be interpreted:
A basic provision is not intended to freeze the existing situation. It
attempts to direct human experience. Accordingly, it must be
interpreted from the stand point of a broad outlook and not in a
technical manner ... constitutional interpretation from a broad
outlook is an interpretation which seeks to implement the objective
purpose of the constitutional text. It does not create a connection
which cannot be severed between the creators of the text and its
interpretation. Interpretation from a broad outlook is not a
subjective interpretation. A broad outlook is an outlook which
observes the past, the present and the future. It is an interpretation
which entails an overall conception of the law at a given time and
in a given society... The meaning of the constitutional text is not

167. See E. INBAR, THE WAR 9 (1998).
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and the
fossilized. Constitutional text is not static but is dynamic,
68
understanding of it changes with the generations.
The drafters of the U.N. Charter were aware of the experiences of the
Second World War; they did not anticipate the development of
international terror. 169 A purposive, objective interpretation of the U.N.
Charter, an interpretation which is compatible with reality and does not let
the past govern the present, would allow a war of self-defense to be
declared even where the enemy is a terrorist organization, where that
organization poses a risk to international peace and security and breaches
the provisions of the U.N. Charter. Accordingly, in the United States,
Congress has been given the power to declare partial war against a specific
aggressive enemy notwithstanding that the enemy is not a state in the usual
sense:
The U.S. Constitution provides that the Congress shall have the
power to declare war. From the earliest days of the republic, the
power of Congress to declare war also has been recognized as the
power to define war. In Talbot v. Seeman, the Supreme Court
recognized the power of Congress to declare a "partial war"
targeted at a particular form of enemy aggression, even though we
were not at war with the enemy nation in a traditional sense. The
Court ruled on measures Congress had adopted to deal with French
privateers who were preying on American commercial shipping....
In Talbot, the Act of Congress considered by the Court authorized
the capture of armed vessels acting either under the authority of the
French Government, or under the pretense of authority, for the
purpose of committing "depredations" on commercial vessels. 70
The important analogy here is that the power given to Congress to
declare partial war against an enemy which is not a state but rather a

168. 3 AHARON BARAK, INTERPRETATION INLAW 84-85,92 (1994). The translation is that of
the author.
169. Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: ChangingNorms Governing the Use
of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 812 (1970).
170. Crona & Richardson, supra note 143, at 360-61 (citations omitted); see also Talbot v.
Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss4/1

44

2003]

Gross:
TheOFLaws
of WarBETWEEN
WagedDEMOCRATIC
Between Democratic
States and
Terrorist Org433
THE LAWS
WAR WAGED
STATES AND TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS

paramilitary force is the same power that Congress may exert today
against terrorist organizations. We have seen different interpretations as
to when it may be possible to use the right to self-defense in international
law. As the right to self-defense is intended to protect the citizens of the
state, there are some who argue that a state whose citizens are in danger
from a terrorist organization is entitled to respond with the use of its armed
forces.171 In the same way as it is inconceivable to ask a man not to defend
himself against a threat to his life, so too it is not possible to prevent a state
from exercising its right, and even its obligation, to protect itself and its
citizens from an anticipated attack - even when the prospective attacker
cannot be called a state. When the lives of the citizens of a state are
threatened by terrorist attacks and the use of force is the only means
available to prevent the acts of the terrorist organizations, the state is
justified, from a moral point of view, within the context of the principle of
self-defense, to defend itself against those organizations.
Following the attempted assassination of President George Bush Sr. in
1993, the United States reacted by launching a missile attack against Iraq.
President Clinton explained the attack as follows: "We will combat
' 72
terrorism. We will deter aggression. We will protect our people.'
Similarly, following the terrorist attack against the United States on
September 11 th, 2001, President George W. Bush declared: "We will take
defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans."'' 73 The day
after the attack against Afghanistan commenced, White House Press
Secretary Ari Fleischer said: "It is the right, under international law, under
the United Nations Charter... to take actions to defend our people
and to
174
do so because we were attacked and because others are at risk."'
Dinstein is of the opinion that in cases where an armed attack is
launched solely by an organization, the targeted state still possesses a right
of self-defense, as article 51 of the U.N. Charter refers to armed attack
against a state, but not necessarily by a state. 75 In the same way as a state
is entitled to defend itself against an armed attack launched by another
state, so too it is certainly entitled to defend itself against an armed attack
by gangs operating from the territory of the other state. This is self-defense

171. Travalio, supra note 32, at 160-61.
172. Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters, 29 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1180, 1181-82 (June 26, 1993).
173. Bush, supra note 1.
174. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, Remarks the Day After the Attack Against
Afghanistan Commenced (Oct. 8, 2001), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pollterror/
01 100814.htm (last visited on Mar. 22, 2003).
175. Id.
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in the nature of an enforcing action, a term intended to express the idea
that the government of the targeted state is operating within the territory
of the host state in place of the government there, and does what that
government should have done. If the host state is not capable or is not
prepared to impose law and order in its territory, it is not entitled to object
to the state injured by the terrorist actions doing so in its place.
Schachter believes that injury to civilians in a foreign state comprises
an armed attack within the meaning of article 51 of the U.N. Charter and
gives rise to the right to self-defense. 76 Coil contends that it would be a
mistake to interpret article 51 as absolutely prohibiting a military reaction
to terror: "[S]elf-defense includes measures necessary to protect the state
and its people from outside armed attack in all its conventional and nonconventional forms" - including, in Coll's view, terrorism. 177 From this
it follows that terrorist attacks against innocent civilians justifies acts of
self-defense. The decision of the U.N. Security Council of September 12th,
2001, following the attack on the United States of September 11 th,
identifies the right of every state to self-defense against such acts as took
place in the United States, namely, acts of terror. 178 It would seem that the
U.N. Security Council acknowledges the need to equate acts of terror (at
least those acts that cause massive loss of life) with an armed attack within
the meaning of article 51 of the U.N. Charter. It refers to the acts as
threatening international peace and security and enables all necessary acts
to be taken in order to respond to the acts of terror. 179 Even those who
believe that this resolution does not amount to an express authorization to
respond with armed force against terrorist attacks agree that the U.N.
Security Council accepts that the right to self-defense is born after the
occurrence of terrorist attacks.' This decision is evidence of an important
development in international law in relation to the interpretation given to
176. Schachter, supra note 153, at 312.
177. Coil, supra note 24, at 307.

178.
Recognizing the inherent right of individual or
The Security Council, ...
collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter, i. Unequivocally
condemns in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks which took place
on 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania and
regards such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international
peace and security.
S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 36 (emphasis omitted).
179. Id.
180. See Frederic L. Kirgis, ASIL Insights: Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon, availableat http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
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armed attack. This is an essential development in view of the phenomenon
of international terrorism.
Acknowledging the right to self-defense in the context of terror is not
sufficient. The conditions for exercising the right must be regulated. As
noted, the CarolineDoctrine and the U.N. Charter deal with cases of selfdefense where the identity and location of the attacking state are not in
doubt. In contrast, the location of terrorist organizations is often unknown
and a period of time is needed to determine their location and whether they
are being supported by a state. The reaction therefore cannot be
immediate. In such a situation and in a situation where it is only possible
to exercise the right to self-defense in the face of a real, concrete and
imminent threat, it is difficult to exercise the right against the activities of
terrorist organizations. The termination of one terrorist act will not end the
threat of further terrorist activities on some uncertain date in the future.
Terrorist activities are characterized by the protracted nature of their
threat, yet without involving continuous acts of extreme violence.'
It would seem that so long as the threshold for exercising the right to
self-defense continues to be so high, it will not be possible to exercise the
right against international terror. Nonetheless, when it is understood that
the traditional theories in international law developed in a completely
different atmosphere - that at that time there was no danger and no
prospect of danger from terrorist organizations operating throughout the
world, obtaining financing from a variety of sources, potentially holding
biological and chemical weapons and capable of mass destruction, and that
all this could be done by individuals and not by states - the use of armed
force in order to cope with the terrorist threat per se need not be a breach
of international law.
Against this background there are those who argue that as the
phenomenon of terror is not a phenomenon which was foreseen by the
drafters of the U.N. Charter - which formulated the Charter on the basis
of the historical experience whereby existential threats could only be posed
by states - a state must be allowed to defend itself against the terrorist
threat in accordance with a new construction. That construction is as
follows: a state threatened by a terrorist organization is entitled to act
against them, and a measure which is taken by that state will not be
deemed to be a breach of article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as it will
comprise the use of limited and temporary force directed solely at
removing the terrorist threat. So long as the activity is not directed against
the civilians or property of the state in which the terrorists are located and

181. Travalio, supra note 32, at 165.
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it is not intended to conquer territory or achieve political gains, the use of
the force will not comprise a violation of territorial integrity or sovereignty
and therefore will not be contrary to article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. Such
an interpretation eliminates the need for justification of the use of force
under article 51 of the U.N. Charter.'82 Others argue that as terrorism is a
new phenomenon, a limited incursion into the territory of the state in
which the terrorists are located will be recognized as a new self-sufficient
exception standing alongside self-defense as an exception to the general
international law rule prohibiting the use of force by one state against
another.183 Terrorism presents a different threat than that which states are
accustomed to facing. Political or economic sanctions, which influence
states, do not influence terrorists. Today, there is fear that terrorists will
use biological or chemical weapons. This fear was sharply felt during the
anthrax scare of October 2001 in the United States - "[l]et's8call
it what
4
it is: Sending mail laced with anthrax is an act of terrorism."'
Accordingly, the right to a limited and transitory incursion into the host
state which refuses or is unable to take measures against the terrorists in
its territory is necessary when we speak of terrorism in the modern age.
Indeed, the International Court of Justice decided in Nicaraguav. United
States that acts of terror are not an armed attack. 85 Accordingly, the right
to self-defense does not arise in relation to them. But the International
Court did not close the door to such a claim being made. The International
Court explained that the right to self-defense under article 51 of the U.N.
Charter only applies in the case of an armed attack, but left open the
question whether the use of force by a state which does not reach the level
of an armed attack is possible when it involves the use of more limited
force than the force which would be justified in the exercise of selfdefense. 86
'
It should be pointed out that it is not certain that the exercise of force
in the territory of another state, however transitory, limited, and focused
for the purpose of removing a terrorist threat, does not violate the
sovereignty of that state. There are many who believe that "most uses of
force, no matter how brief, limited, or transitory, do violate a state's

182. See Jordan J.Paust, Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism, 8 WHTTIERL. REV.
711,716-17 (1986).
183. Travalio, supra note 32, at 166-68.
184. Richard Butler, Who Made the Anthrax?, N.Y. TimES, Oct. 18, 2001, at 27A.
185. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
186. Travalio, supra note 32, at 169.
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territorial integrity."' 87 For example, the United States itself,
notwithstanding that it justified the actions of the state of Israel in the
Entebbe Operation, saw this operation as a breach of the sovereignty of
Uganda. 88
Nonetheless, the theory regarding the right of a state to violate in a
limited manner the sovereignty of another state which cannot act against
terrorists located within its borders is a theory which is acceptable to most
nations, provided the terrorists pose a threat to the attacking state. These
nations themselves are subject to a potential threat of terrorist action by a
variety of terrorist organizations and therefore they understand that the
threat affects the entire world community.
The idea of enabling armed force to be used in order to attack terrorist
organizations which are located in other countries must be made
compatible with article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. First, the state which
plans to-make use of force must ensure that the objectives being targeted
for attack pose a terrorist threat which is likely to lead to an attack, and
that the state in which the terrorists are located is not able or is not willing
to deal with them. The level of proof needed is not beyond any reasonable
doubt. One must at least present clear and convincing evidence, as it is
possible that innocent people will be killed, and therefore it would not be
moral to take such a large risk without being certain that the planned target
is appropriate and that the threat is real and serious.' 8 9 In Nicaragua,
mentioned above, the International Court implied the minimum conditions
required in order to enable a military response against a terrorist attack,
including the requirement "that the nation carefully evaluate[s] the
evidence to ensure a high degree of certainty that it has identified those
responsible for an attack and that more attacks are imminent."'"
Second, the use of power will be limited to one purpose only - the
need to remove the terrorist threat. So long as the state does not support
the organization no action may be taken against its facilities and military
camps. Third, the use of force must be proportional to the size of the
threat; the use of force must be restrained. Fourth, the threat need not be
187.

ROSLYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS & PROCESS: INTERNATIONALLAW AND How WE USE IT 240

(1994).
188. See Memorandum by Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor of the Department of State, to Henry
A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, (July 8, 1976), in JOHN NORTON MOORE ET AL., NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW 189-90 (1990).
189. CASHER, supra note 157; see also Emanuel Gross, Human Rights in Administrative
Proceedings: A Questfor an Appropriate EvidentiaryStandard, 31 CAL.W. INT'LL. REV. 215,216
(2001).
190. Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to TerroristAttacks: The Bombing of Sudan
and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 537, 547 (1999).
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imminent in accordance with the requirement in article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, but it must be likely that the threat will indeed be realized. 19'
Fifth, force may not be used unless all non-violent means have been
exhausted, or it is clear that the threat is about to be realized prior to the
conclusion of efforts to resolve the dispute by peaceful means.' 92
The latter requirement - to exhaust peaceful measures - is the most
important and problematic of the requirements where the enemy is a
terrorist organization. We have seen that self-defense is an exception to the
theory whereby disputes are resolved by the normative structures of the
rule of law - within the state, by the authorities responsible for the
enforcement of the law between states, and on the international level, in
accordance with the U.N. Charter. The latter offers a mechanism to resolve
disputes peacefully with the help of the U.N. Security Council, unless
there is an imminent existential threat which requires immediate defensive
action, and even in such a case notification of the action must be given to
the U.N. Security Council and the latter will examine if it is indeed
indispensable.
In other words, the requirement that disputes which provide grounds
for war first be resolved by means of negotiations is compatible with the
U.N. Charter and international law. The state of Israel, for example, acted
in this way with the Palestinian authority prior to engaging in military
actions required to defend its citizens.1 93 Likewise, the U.N. Security
Council acted in this way with the Taliban government in Afghanistan
which was sheltering the terrorist organizations under the leadership of
Osama bin Laden.
In Resolution 1333 of December 19th, 2000,194 the U.N. Security
Council condemned the Taliban government and demanded that it respond

191. Michael N. Schmitt, State-SponsoredAssassinationin InternationalandDomestic Law,
17 YALE J. INT'L L. 609, 648-49 (1992); Travalio, supra note 32, at 172.
192, Travalio, supra note 32, at 172.
193. Gross, supra note 158, at 211-12.
194. The U.N. Security Council:
Strongly condemnied] the continuing use of the areas of Afghanistan under the
control of the Afghan faction known as Taliban ... for the sheltering and training
of terrorists and planning of terrorists acts, and reaffirm[ed] its conviction that the
suppression of international terrorism is essential for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4251st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (2000) (emphasis

omitted).
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to the demands already made on it in the prior Resolution 1267 9' to
extradite Osama bin Laden, close all the training camps of the terrorists,
and take all necessary measures in order to ensure that the territory under
its control not be used by the terrorist organizations for their needs. The
U.N. Security Council indicated that it saw the refusal of the Taliban
government to respond to these demands as a threat to international peace
and security.
The response of the Taliban government to these resolutions was given
on September 11 th, 2001, with the brutal terror attacks against American
citizens inside the United States. This response focuses our attention on the
central problem - the terrorist organizations do not see themselves as
bound by the provisions of the U.N. Charter, nor subject to the resolutions
of the U.N. Security Council. In fact, the U.N. Security Council, which is
responsible for bringing disputes to peaceful resolution and preventing
armed struggles, does not have the tools to fight terrorist organizations.
Moreover, it is not competent to act against them, as these organizations
have no institutional or contractual connection with the United Nations.
This is the reason why they are not subject to its authority and it is also the
reason why there is no logical reason for asking a state threatened by a
terrorist organization to turn first to the U.N. Security Council for the latter
to attempt to deal with the threat within the framework of its normative
structures.
It should be pointed out that the United States acted in accordance with
the requirements described above before taking military action. After the
attack on the United States on September 11 th, 2001, the President of the
United States demanded of the Taliban government that it close the
terrorist training camps and extradite the terrorist leaders to the United
195. The U.N. Security Council:
Insists that the Afghan faction known as the Taliban... comply promptly with its
previous resolutions and in particular cease the provision of sanctuary and training
for international terrorists and their organizations, take appropriate effective
measures to ensure that the territory in its control is not used for terrorist
installations and camps, or for the preparation or organization of terrorist acts
against other States or their citizens, and cooperate with efforts to bring indicted
terrorists to justice ...Demands that the Taliban turn over Usama bin Laden
without further delay to appropriate authorities in a country where he has been
indicted, or to appropriate authorities in a country where he will be returned to
such a country, or to appropriate authorities in a country where he will be arrested
and effectively brought to justice.
S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4051st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999) (emphasis
omitted).
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States. Only after a wait of about two weeks, in which these demands were
not met, did President Bush declare that the Taliban would pay for their
crimes.
In his speech to the nation in relation to the military response against
Afghanistan, the President emphasized that the targets were military
targets of the Taliban government and the terrorist organizations being
sheltered by it. The action would be taken solely for the purpose of
removing the threat; the United States was interested in harming the
terrorists, not the Afghan population:
We're a peaceful nation. Yet, as we have learned, so suddenly and
so tragically, there can be no peace in a world of sudden terror. In
the face of today's new threat, the only way to pursue peace is to
pursue those who threaten it. . . . By destroying camps and
disrupting communications, we will make it more difficult for the
terror network to train new recruits and coordinate their evil
plans.... Our military action is also designed to clear the way for
sustained, comprehensive and relentless operations to drive them
out and bring them to justice. At the same time, the oppressed
people of Afghanistan will know the generosity of America and our
allies. As we strike military targets, we will also drop food,
medicine and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women
and children of Afghanistan."9
We have emphasized the importance of the requirement of resolving
disputes by negotiation, and we have seen that this requirement does not
bear fruit when the clash is with terrorist organizations. The inevitable
conclusion is that where states, seeking to defend themselves against a
terrorist threat, are not satisfied by one alternative, they must seek another
which stands on its own and directly addresses ways of coping with
international terror. The solution, in my opinion, may be found in a
modern development of the second type of self-defense dealt with by
article 51 of the U.N. Charter. We would emphasize that the solution is not
in the second type of self-defense in its current sense. It is necessary to
engage in a new, modern construction which accords with the changing
circumstances.

196. President Pledges Broader Battle Against Sponsors of Terrorists, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 8,
2001, at 13.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss4/1

52

2003]

THE LAWS
WAR of
WAGED
WEEN DEMOCRATIC
STATES AND TERRORST
ORGAN174TIONS
Gross:
TheOF
Laws
WarBET
Waged
Between Democratic
States and
Terrorist Org 441

Article 51 does not only deal with individual self-defense exercised by
a single state. The article also speaks of collective self-defense. Collective
self-defense is, in essence, team action taken by a number of states in
response to an armed attack. Two situations are contemplated. The first is
self-defense by a number of states which have simultaneously fallen victim
to an armed attack by a single enemy, and all act together in a coordinated
counter attack. The second situation is where a single state has fallen
victim to an armed attack
by a single enemy, and a third state decides to
19 7
join the defensive war.
In Part III, we saw the narrow interpretation given to a defensive war
under which the reaction to an armed attack may only be taken by the
injured state. Such an interpretation makes the second category of
collective self-defense meaningless. When we are dealing with the
problem of international terror which is spreading fast and dangerously
throughout the world, the narrow interpretation given to self-defense turns
article 51 of the U.N. Charter into a suicidal provision. There is no dispute
that this was not the intentions of its drafters. On the contrary, when one
understands the theory underlying the U.N. Charter - the lessons learned
from the Second World War - collective self-defense is the only
insurance policy existing in the international community against armed
attack. 19'
When the U.N. Charter was formulated, the prevailing fear was of an
armed attack by a great military power against a number of other
countries. Today, the fear is of a different type of power, power which is
not a known, defined and recognized state. Rather, it is a terrorist power
whose tentacles reach out throughout the world, threatening international
peace and security by carrying out destructive armed attacks of a terrorist
nature. This complex situation is likely to lead every state which believes
itself subject to future attack to the conclusion that it must launch a
counterattack on the basis of the right to individual self-defense. The
ramifications of such a situation are likely to be calamitous and
irreversible. If every state decides to fight terrorism on its own, to fight an
enemy which is not identified and which is not located solely in one
country, the outcome is likely to be a third world war. Such a result would
be a victory for international terrorism.
The inescapable conclusion is that recognition must be given to
collective self-defense, in order to fight a single enemy - terrorism. The
rule of proportionality of self-defense requires that the response conform

197. DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 82-83.
198. Id. at 84.
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to the degree of the threat. 9 9 As the threat is not directed at a single state
and the danger is international, the reaction must also be international. An
international body must be set up which will have the competence and
power to launch a war against terrorist organizations.
The source of power for establishing such a body may be found, in my
opinion, in the U.N. Charter itself. Article 39 of the U.N. Charter enables
the U.N. Security Council to exercise collective security in every case of
a threat to peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.2°° Collective
security means institutionalization of the legal use of force by the
international community. Collective security is exercised by virtue of a
legally binding resolution of a central organ of the international
community. The central organ according to Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter
is the U.N. Security Council.
It should be recalled that whereas Article 51 enables a state to respond
to an armed attack only, Article 39 enables the U.N. Security Council to
respond, within the framework of collective security, to an attack which
does not amount to an armed attack. Thus, for example, the U.N. Security
Council is entitled to decide on a preventive war in response to a threat to
the peace. Article 40 enables the U.N. Security Council to engage in
provisional measures, prior to making the final decisions in accordance
with Article 39, in order to prevent the situation from being aggravated.2 '
According to Article 42, if "the Security Council considers that the
measures [referred to above] would be inadequate or have proved to be
inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. 2 °2 In
other words, it may decide to launch a war against the aggressor state.
As noted, the U.N. Charter speaks of states. A breach of international
peace and security may, according to the U.N. Charter, issue solely from
sovereign entities - states - and therefore measures of collective
security may only be directed against states and not at international
terrorist organizations which are not states.
In the light of the above, two alternatives exist. First, the U.N. Charter
may be interpreted in the same way as a constitution, in the spirit of the

199. Guy B. Roberts, Self-Help in Combatting State-Sponsored Terrorism: SelfDefense and
Peacetime Reprisals, 19 CASE W. RES. J.INT'L L. 243, 282 (1987).
200. U.N. CHARTER art. 39: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat
to peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security."
201. Id. art. 40.
202. Id. art. 42.
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times, and therefore as including the possibility of self-defense against a
terrorist organization. Secondly, one may learn the lessons of the recent
terrorist attacks against the United States, to the effect that the provisions
of the U.N. Charter fail to provide a satisfactory answer to the terrorist
threat. In such a case, action must be taken to unite all the states of the free
world in an international convention which will establish cooperative
measures of a legal, political and strategic nature in the fight against
international terrorism. The convention may adopt the U.N. Charter as a
basis for the counter-terrorism structures, but it will focus on this issue
only, and will establish an international body, in the nature of a permanent
international force, whose soldiers have one objective only - to fight
terror.
VI. THE FATE OF A STATE WHICH HARBORS TERRORISTS

One of the known phenomena of the modern world is that of
governments and regimes financing terrorist activities; generally these
regimes also make use of terrorist tactics.2 3 The dangers posed by this
phenomenon are patent, and coping with them may entail a military
response. Such a response will only be justified as a matter of international
law if it falls within the exception of self-defense.
After the terrorist attack against the United States, President George W.
Bush explained in his speech to Congress: "Every nation, in every region,
now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the
terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or
will be regarded by the United States as a hostile
support ' terrorism
regime." 4
In this section, we shall examine whether a state which harbors
terrorism is a state which carries out an armed attack within the meaning
of the U.N. Charter - an attack which permits the victim state to respond
in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, by way of self-defense,
as implied by the speech delivered by President George W. Bush.
When dealing with the question of the nature of a state harboring
terrorism, it is first necessary to define the term "terrorism." Literature and
case law have given a number of definitions to the term terrorism. One of
these is as follows: "[T]errorism is narrowly defined as the explicit and
deliberate (as opposed to collateral) destruction or threat of destruction of
nonmilitary, nongovernmental personnel in the course of political or other

203. Lohr, supra note 156, at 1.
204. Bush, supra note 1.
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forms of warfare." 20 5 The U.S. State Department further distinguishes
between terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism. 2°6 The primary difference
between the two definitions is the fact that international terrorism is
generally supported by states or international organizations. Terrorists,
whether acting individually or in groups, operate from a particular
location. Accordingly, theoretically there is no doubt that every activity
has a connection to the state in which the terrorist bases are located. This
is the reason why their activities are initially examined in accordance with
the degree of their connection to the state. Terrorist organizations and their
representatives differ in relation to the degree to which they are sponsored
by states.20 7
Antonio Cassese has identified six types of connections between states
and terrorists, ranging from the highest degree of state intervention to the
lowest:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Terrorist acts performed by actual state officials.
State employment of unofficial agents for terrorist acts.
State supply of financial aid or weapons.
State supply of logistical support.
State acquiescence to the presence of terrorist bases within its territory.
State provision of neither active nor passive help.20 8

Likewise, John Murphy has set out twelve categories of state
involvement in international terrorism:
* State Terrorism, the most active type of involvement, includes
the use of state intelligence operatives to carry out terrorist acts
in foreign countries.
" Direct Support is comprised of two distinct elements: planning
and guidance. Planning means that the state is directly involved
in the development of programs of action . . . involving
terrorism. . . . Guidance is more general and includes
information on how programs of action can be developed....

205. Coil, supra note 24, at 297-98.
206. OFFICE FOR COMBATING

TERRORISM,

U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE,

PATTERNS

OF

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 1982 (1983).

207. Beck & Arend, supra note 31, at 163.
208. Antonio Cassese, The InternationalCommunity's "Legal" Response to Terrorism, 38

INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 589, 598 (1989).
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• Intelligence Support to terrorists is the
provision of
information, but unlike Direct Support, implies no control over
what the terrorists do with the information provided.
* Trainingto terrorists is divided into two categories: Specialized
Terrorist and Basic Military. [Specialized terrorist] includes
training in intelligence gathering, infiltration, surveillance, and
the use of sophisticated communications equipment, explosives,
or weapons. [Basic military] consists of basic infantry training
with standard weapons including physical conditioning,
marksmanship, hand-to-hand combat, and small unit tactics.
* DiplomaticAssets includes providing passports, documents, and
other forms of cover....
• Provision of High Technology including nuclear, biological,
chemical and exotic weapons is a type of terrorism where state
involvement is extremely important and perhaps essential.
* Provision of Weapons and explosives....
* Provision of Transportation:includes not only the actual turning
over of vehicles, boats, and so forth to terrorists, but also
allowing the use of national transportation agencies . . . by

•

•
•
*

terrorists.
By permitting terrorists Use of Territory a country supporting
terrorism knowingly allows terrorists to use or transit national
territory to plan attacks, train, avoid extradition, and otherwise
elude international legal processes....
FinancialSupport....
Tacit Support implies foreknowledge and failure to act....
Rhetorical supportsuggests specific statements or speeches by
authoritative government figures that call for, express approval
of, or endorse the use of terrorism. It also includes government
facilitation or support of terrorist efforts to communicate with
target populations. 209

209. JOHN F. MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: LEGAL, POLITICAL,
AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS 32-33 (1989); see also Bill Hoffmann, Dr. Germ: Saddam'sScientist

Behind Anthrax Outbreak, N.Y. POST, Oct. 22,2001, at 001. Following the anthrax attack against
the United States, the United States sought the connection between this bio-terrorism and any state
encouraging the development of biological weapons used by the terrorist organizations. As this is
not basic or simple weaponry, state involvement is essential. In an article in the New York Post,Bill
Hoffmann describes the attempt by the United States to link the biological attack to Iraq: "'there

is no question in my mind these anthrax attacks in Florida, New York and Washington involve
international terrorists,' said Richard Spertzel... [a]nd Iraq is the prime suspect as the supplier."
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The most common four part classification of state involvement in

terrorist activities is as follows:
1. Terrorists acting with state sponsorship: a state contributes active,
planning, direction, and control to terrorist operations.
2. Terrorists acting with state support, but not immediate state
sponsorship: a state's provision of intelligence, weapons, diplomatic
assets, funds, or rhetorical endorsement.
3. Terrorists acting with state toleration, but not state support or
sponsorship:when a state does not support or sponsor terrorist groups
within its borders, but knows of their existence and fails to suppress
them.
4. Terroristsacting without toleration, supportor sponsorship.10
A state which sponsors the various forms of terrorist acts thereby
breaches international law. The U.N. General Assembly has, on a number
of occasions, condemned international terrorism and state sponsorship of
the same: "[N]o State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite, or
tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed toward the violent
overthrow of [another] regime."'
It should be noted that the prohibition is broadly worded and general
and this is significant. A resolution of this type condemns the permission
given by a state to a terrorist organization to locate itself within its
territory, without the state taking any active part in the terrorist activity.
Notwithstanding the non-binding nature of the resolutions, there are those
who argue that these resolutions and the practice of states have created a
duty as a matter of international customary law to refrain from permitting
the organization of terrorist activities within their borders.21 2 A state
breaches its obligations under international law towards other states, when
it knowingly enables international terrorist activities to be carried out from
its territory. There is no doubt that when a state finances or supports
23
terrorist organizations it breaches its duties under international law.
A state which finances, supports or permits terrorist activities which
target the territorial integrity, sovereignty or political independence of
another state breaches Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. In March 1992, the
U.N. Security Council referred to the relationship between Article 2(4) and

210. Beck & Arend, supra note 31, at 164.
211. G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1408th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/20/2131(1965).
212. RICHARD ERICKSON, LEGITIMATE USE OF FORCE AGAINST STATE-SPONSORED
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 100-03 (1989).
213. Baker, supra note 41, at 36.
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the involvement of a state in terrorism. Economic sanctions were imposed
on Libya by reason of its connection with terrorist activities, and it was
decided that:
In accordance with the principle in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the
Charter of the United Nations, every State has the duty to refrain
from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist
acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its
territory directed toward commission
of such acts, when such acts
214
involve a threat or use of force.
In other words, the U.N. General Assembly interpreted article 2(4) as
prohibiting the first three categories of the four described above: a state
financing, a state supporting and a state permitting terrorist activities to be
carried out from its territory. If so, what is the position of a state harboring
terrorism? Is a state the principal when it-is aware of terrorist organizations
operating in its territory but takes no action against them? Are these
organizations agents for which the state is vicariously liable? If that were
the case, it would be easier to justify - as explained in Part V of this
Article - an armed response against the sovereign entity, the state, as
opposed to the organization which is not a state. As we have explained, the
U.N. Charter is not directed at individuals but at states. Accordingly, in my
opinion, if it is possible to prove that a certain state hosts terrorist
organizations, the individuals performing the acts may be seen as agents
of the principal state, and their activities may be regarded as the activities
of the state, comprising an armed attack giving rise to a right to selfdefense on the part of the targeted state.
From a moral point of view, there is more justification for acting
against the principals and permitting the victim state to take action against
the state suspected of hosting the persons responsible for the terrorist acts.
This position has important ramifications for international law. For
example, if the victim state decides to react by means of its armed forces
on grounds of self-defense under article 51 of the U.N. Charter, it may
thereby breach article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
Historical experience has proved that the U.N. Security Council does
not permit a state which falls victim to terrorist attacks to respond by
means of its armed forces against the state which it alleges hosts the

214. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992).
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terrorist organizations. For example, on October 1st, 1985, Israeli aircraft
bombed the headquarters of the PLO near Tunis. Israel justified its actions
before the U.N. Security Council on the grounds that Tunisia was
knowingly hosting terrorists whose objective was to injure Israel.
According to Israel, a state could not demand protection of its sovereignty
when it knowingly offered part of its territory as a base for terrorist
operations against another state:
Tunisia knew very well what was going on in this extraterritorial
base, the planning that took place there, the missions that were
launched from it, and the purposes of those missions: repeated
armed attacks against my country and against innocent civilians
around the world. Tunisia, then, actually provided a base for
murderous activity against another State, and in fact, the nationals
of many States who are the objects and victims of this terrorist
organization. The protection of sovereignty cannot be claimed by
any Government when it makes available2 such
facilities, especially
5
against the State that must protect itself.

However, the U.N. Security Council rejected the arguments of the state
of Israel, and condemned its actions against Tunisia. The U.N. Security
Council regarded' the action of Israel as one of aggression which
threatened regional peace and security, i.e., breached article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter. Another example would be the United States attack against
Libya. On April 14th, 1986, American forces attacked five terrorist targets
in Tripoli and Benghazi. Thirty-seven people were killed and ninety-three
injured. That night, President Ronald Reagan explained the justification
for the attack:
The evidence is now conclusive that the terrorist bombing of
LaBelle discotheque [in West Berlin] was planned and executed
under the direct orders of the Libyan regime ....

We have solid

evidence about other attacks [Libyan leader Colonel Muammar]
Qadhafi has planned against the U.S. installations and diplomats
and even American tourists.... Self-defense is not only our right,
it is our duty. It is the purpose of the mission undertaken
tonight.

.

. I warned that there should be no place on earth where

215. U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2615 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2615 (1985).
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terrorists can rest and train and practice their deadly skills. I meant
it.216

In this case, the U.N. Security Council decided that the United States'
attack was "not justified as an act of self-defense because there was no
antecedent aggression by Libya... U.S. charges of Libyan involvement
in terrorism were unsubstantiated . . . [and the attacks were] U.S.
aggression against 'progressive' third world countries ...[designed] to
thwart Libya's support of wars of national liberation" - in short, that the
United States engaged in state terrorism.2 7 The United States, Great
Britain, and France vetoed a resolution sanctioning the United States.
Australia and Denmark opposed it.
The development of international terrorism and its inherent dangers, as
exemplified on September 1lth, 2001, require a modification of the
position of the U.N. Security Council, a modification which has been
reflected in its recent decisions in the aftermath of the attack on the United
States. In Resolution 1368, the U.N. Security Council acknowledged the
right to self-defense in the context of acts of terror: "The Security
Council... [d]etermined to combat by all means threats to international
peace and security caused by terrorist acts, recogniz[es] the inherent right
21 8
of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter.
One may ask - what degree of state support for terrorist organizations
located in its territory amounts to an armed attack within the meaning of
article 51 of the U.N. Charter, allowing the victim state to respond against
the host state? The accepted view is that when a state is weak and
incapable of controlling the terrorist activities taking place within its
territory, there is no armed attack by that state against another, and
therefore the use of force against the host state is prohibited by article 51
of the U.N. Charter. 1 9 When the host state does not cooperate with the
terrorist organizations operating from its territory, or is incapable of
dealing with them, it is only the terrorist organization, and not the host
state, which carries out the armed attack against the victim state.22°

216. Ronald Reagan, Speech to the Nation (Apr. 14, 1986), inU.S. Dept of State, Bureau of
Public Affairs, InternationalTerrorism, 24 SPEC. REP. 1 (1986).
217. William V. O'Brien, Reprisals,Deterrenceand Self-defense in CounterterrorOperations,
30 VA. J. INT'L L. 462, 464-65 (1990).
218. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 36 (emphasis omitted).
219. See MURPHY, supra note 209, at 39.
220. DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 75.
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According to customary international law, the presumption whereby a
state is vicariously liable for all acts carried out within its territory by its
citizens or foreigners, may be rebutted. Responsibility is not absolute.2"2 '
The duty of the state is to prevent the commission of illegal acts against
another state, and to punish perpetrators. If the state neglects its duty, it
breaches its obligations under international law and is vicariously liable.

However, if the state does everything it can to prevent terrorist
organizations from operating out of its territory, and for objective reasons
fails, it will not be vicariously responsible for the acts of the terrorist
organizations.2 .2 Legislative proposals regarding the definition of a state
supporting international terrorism do not include within the definition a
state which does not have real control over the terrorist activities launched
from its territory or a state which does not have a real ability to prevent
such acts.223
There are some who argue that a state which allows terrorist activities
to be conducted from its territory or encourages such activity must be
regarded as a state which carries out an armed attack within the meaning
of article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 2 4 The reason for this lies in the fact that
armed attack is a narrower term than the term "aggression. ' 225 We have
seen that one of the definitions of the term aggression given by the U.N.
General Assembly is the sending of armed bands to carry out serious
attacks against another state.226 This definition does not state that giving
permission for such an operation is aggression per se, and therefore it is
not an armed attack.
If we allow a different interpretation whereby granting such permission
is per se an armed attack, there will be a potential danger of violating the
basic principle of the U.N. Charter regarding refraining from the use of
military force in order to resolve disputes. On the other hand, there are
those who argue that the term armed attack must be given a contemporary
interpretation which allows it to embrace various situations in which a
state hosts terrorist organizations within its territory. Thus, for example,
Dinstein is of the opinion that a victim state has the right to self-defense
in cases where the host state directly or indirectly assists the attacks of the
armed bands. In his opinion, this amounts to an armed attack by one state
against another, giving rise to the right to self-defense under article 51 of

221.

OPPENHEIM, supra note 163, at 337-38, 365.

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Lohr, supra note 156, at 8.
MURPHY, supra note 209, at 39.
ERICKSON, supra note 212, at 134.
See infra Part III.
G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 45, art. 3.
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the U.N. Charter.227 Dinstein classifies this as a form of self-defense called
enforcement or necessary action, where the armed attack is not launched
by the regular forces of the state but by third party armed bands - here,
terrorists - who operate on a hit and run basis from the territory of the
host state.228
Frederic L. Kirgis considered the possibility of U.S. retaliation for the
terrorist acts which took place on September 11th, 2001. In his opinion:
"[A]ny armed reprisal by the United States against 'harboring' states could
only be justified as an act of self-defense. 229 When a state provides active
support to terrorist organizations, there are those who agree that this
comprises an armed attack within the meaning of article 51 of the U.N.
Charter. According to Oscar Schachter, "[w]hen a government provides
weapons, technical advice, transportation, aid and encouragement to
terrorists on a substantial scale, it is not unreasonable to conclude that an
armed attack is imputable to the government. ' 230 Baker argues that a state
will be regarded as responsible for the terrorist acts launched from its
territory, and these will amount to an armed attack, if only because it
permits these acts: "Where the state itself is behind the terrorist attacks, its
responsibility is clear .... [E]ven if a government does not support or
approve a particular act of terrorism, if such activities are generally
tolerated or encouraged, they become the responsibility of that
government. 23 '
In contrast, others hold that the active support of a state is not sufficient
to comprise an armed attack. In their view, something additional is needed,
namely, that the state has real control over the terrorist organizations. 232 In
Nicaraguav. United States, the International Court of Justice dealt with
the issue of state supported terrorism. There, the International Court
rejected the U.S. argument to the effect that the support of Nicaragua for
the El Salvador rebels justified the attack by the United States against
Nicaragua on the grounds of self-defense. The International Court
expressly held that the supply of arms and logistical support by one state
to opposition parties in another state does not amount to an armed attack
within the meaning of article 51 of the U.N. Charter.233 The International
227.

DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 75.
228. See J.J. Lador-Lederer, Defining "Terrorism" - A Comment, in TERRORISM AND
PotrrICAL VIOLENCE 10 (Henry H. Han ed., 1993).
229. Frederic L. Kirgis, ASIL Insights: Addendum to ASIL Insight on Terrorist Attacks,
available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
230. Schachter, supra note 153.
231. Baker, supra note 41, at 36-38.
232. See Lador-Lederer, supra note 228, at 10.
233. Travalio, supra note 32, at 158.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

63

IUONAL
LAW 4 [2003], Art. 1
JOURNAL OFINTERNA
Florida JournalFLORIDA
of International
Law, Vol.
15, Iss.

[Vol. 15

Court left open the possibility of the victim state engaging in proportionate
countermeasures. This case leaves open many unresolved questions. For
example, when a state not only supplies weapons and logistical support but
also enables terrorists to train in its territory and supplies them safe bases
in which to hide - cannot this also be considered an armed attack?
In my opinion, when a state supplies massive and continuous support
to terrorist organizations which have previously struck disastrously at the
innocent population of another state, or there is a strong likelihood,
supported by clear evidence, that such disasters will occur in the future,
this should be deemed to be an armed attack and the victim state must be
allowed to defend itself against future attacks by means of a military
response under article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Of course, it is necessary to
prove that that state provides support to the terrorist organizations.
However, the question which must be asked is whether it is necessary to
have proof that the state supported the specific terrorist act which
occurred. The U.S. Attorney-General has pointed to three rules which
indicate that a state is supporting a terrorist organization, support which
enables retaliation to be effected against the state itself:
[1.]

[2.]

[3.]

When [a state] ... learn[s] that any official, agency, or party

in a State is materially involved in an incident [of terrorism],
that should be treated as strong evidence of State
responsibility....
[E]ven if no evidence is developed that a State is directly
responsible for specific terrorist acts, the State's general and
continuing support for a group known to be engaged in
terrorism should suffice to establish responsibility for aiding
or conspiring, if not as a principal in the crime itself.
Differences in the degree of proof of actual approval by a
State should operate to vary the degree of responsibility and
the remedies imposed...
The public revelation of sensitive information should not be
considered a routine procedure to which . . . States are

expected to adhere.234
There are those who believe that no comparison should be drawn
between a defensive war and the situation of states sponsoring terrorism.
The reason for this is not because a terror attack is not an armed attack, but
rather because of the exceptional nature of the phenomenon of terror. This

234. Sofaer, supra note 42, at 105.
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phenomenon involves mobile groups which operate out of a variety of
population centers and thereby cause the victim state which is interested
in defending itself by way of a military response to take the risk that
during those response innocent civilians will be killed. This risk alone is
sufficient to prevent the preconditions of a defensive war proportionality and reasonableness - from being met. This, for example,
is the view of Jeffery Simon:
Strategies such as deterrence, preemption, and retaliation have a
different meaning when applied to terrorist groups than when
applied to nation states. The main deterrence lies in the concept of
rationality, a critical component of deterrence. While it may be
reasonable to assume that one government will react rationally to
the policies of another, the same cannot be said for terrorist groups
that utilize suicide tactics. It is likewise difficult to deter an enemy
whose objective may be to create an escalating cycle of violence.
The amorphous nature of terrorism further complicates the issue. It
is often difficult, if not impossible, to identify who is responsible
for a given incident or to locate the terrorists' base of
operations.... Terrorists can easily merge into urban areas, thus
ensuring that any retaliatory 23or
preemptive attack will result in the
5
deaths of innocent civilians.
On the assumption that it is possible to minimize the risk that civilians
will be injured, and that a terrorist action indeed comprises an armed
attack which confers on the victim state the right to self-defense, a number
of questions arise: (1) When may the state victimized by terrorism
properly respond?; (2) What response would be regarded as proportional
to a terrorist act?; and (3) What objectives may appropriately be targeted
by the victim state?
A. Timing
Boyle is of the opinion that a response must be immediate, or "on the
spot" - a state might take action solely "in the event of an actual or
perhaps imminent 'armed attack' against the state itself. By definition, this
would not include military retaliation and reprisal since they occur after

235.

JEFFREY D. SIMON, MISPERCEIVING THE TERRORIST THREAT 10 (1987).
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the fact. '236 Baker, however, believes that the requirement for an
immediate response, when referring to the response of a state, is not
reasonable. He therefore advocates a more moderate approach:
[T]he element of time cannot be ignored when examining the
necessity of the response. This temporal element of the requirement
of necessity means that a response must be made close in time to
the actual attack. . . . [a]n individual's response is normally
spontaneous, whereas a state requires a more calculated response
when its "collective life is threatened. 237
Cassese allows an interval between the occurrence of the terrorist act
and the response of the victim state. Such a construction is compatible
with the international law principle which allows an armed response as a
final measure, after all peaceful measures have been exhausted - "the
force actually used must be ...necessary in the sense that attempts at
achieving a peaceful solution have already been exhausted. 238 Coll takes
an even more far-reaching approach, arguing that a modem interpretation
must be given to the requirement of immediacy in the CarolineDoctrine,
in view of the complexity of the phenomenon of terrorism - "long-term
deterrence and short-term prevention of terrorism are legally justifiable

under the general provisions of article 5 1."239

O'Brien agrees with Coll - "self-defense should be interpreted as
taking two forms: on-the-spot reaction and defensive reprisals at a time
and a place different from those of the original armed attack. '21 Judge
Sofaer agrees that the requirement of immediacy and necessity must be
modified in view of the changes in circumstances since the Caroline
Doctrine, and therefore in his opinion A sound construction of article 51 would allow any State, once a
terrorist "attack occurs" or is about to occur, to use force against
those responsible for the attack in order to prevent the attack or to

236.
237.
238.
239.

Boyle, supra note 31, at 294.
Baker, supra note 41, at 34.
Cassese, supra note 208, at 597.
Coil, supra note 24, at 300.
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deter further attacks unless reasonable ground exists to believe that
no further attack will be undertaken.24 '
B. Proportionality
Even if the exercise of armed force is allowed against the host state and
the terrorist organizations being harbored by it, it is still necessary that the
exercise of force is restrained and proportional.
One may ask - proportional to what? There are those who believe that
the proportionality must be in relation to the threat - "any response to an
act of aggression which employs a level of violence which is greater than
is necessary to counter any continuing immediate threat must be viewed
as impermissible. '242 Others believe that when dealing with international
terrorism, proportionality is measured in relation to the terrorist actions
already committed in the past, and accordingly, even if minor terrorist acts
are committed but the acts are numerous, these will justify a single large
action in response.243
A state which exercises its military force within the framework of selfdefense must determine the level of force needed in order to rebuff the
enemy or eliminate the immediate threat, depending on the circumstances
of the conflict and the ability of the enemy to attack and harm the state and
its citizens. A state must do everything in accordance with the defensive
needs of the citizens and the state, but no more. 244 Accordingly, in my
opinion, in view of the nature of international terrorism, the real dangers
which it entails, and the lethal consequences which may ensue if certain
terrorist attacks take place - as we saw on September 11th, 2001 - the
demand of proportionality must be interpreted in a broader manner. In
other words, in order to provide real security for the citizens of states being
targeted by terrorists, the targeted states (or states which will potentially
be targeted) must set as their goal the eradication of the terror. In order for
this to be possible, a level of response must be allowed which relates both
to past attacks and to future attacks.
C. Appropriate Objectives
There is no doubt that when a state acts in self-defense against terrorist
organizations in another state, it must distinguish between the terrorist
organizations, the terrorists themselves, and innocent civilians.

241. Sofaer, supra note 42, at 95.
242. Intoccia, supra note 149, at 206.
243. Roberts, supra note 199, at 282.
244. CASHER, supra note 157, at 67.
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Self-defense actions against terrorism are not exempt from the
humanitarian rules applicable to armed conflict. Thus, the general
prohibition against [targeting] non-combatants or excessive
destruction of civilian property apply. The fact that terrorist bases
are found in the midst of cities, and may therefore be "shielded" by
non-combatants, can give rise to a difficult dilemma. It is
nonetheless desirable to recognize legal as well as moral restraints
relating to non-combatants.24
Others hold that the objectives must be limited to specific people who
are directly responsible for the terrorist acts - "[t]he best standard should
require that in all circumstances only the individuals and technology
involved in illegal activity be targeted."246
In my opinion, so long as the state which allegedly sponsors terrorist
acts is a state which is not capable or has not succeeded, despite its efforts,
in suppressing the terrorist acts taking place within its territory, no armed
force may be used against that host state. Any force must be directed
exclusively at the terrorists. However, when we are dealing with a state
which is actively supporting terrorism, or a state which finances terrorism,
or a state which knowingly permits terrorist acts within its territory and
does not take steps to stop them, such a state takes the risk and must
foresee that military objectives within that state, and not only those
belonging to the terrorist organizations, will be struck. Of course, in these
cases too, the state acting in self-defense is obliged to act in accordance
with the laws of war and target only the objectives which may lawfully be
attacked under these laws. 247
VII. THE MEASURES AVAILABLE TO A DEMOCRATIC STATE
IN THE WAR AGAINST TERROR

The measures to be made available to a democratic state in its war
against terrorism must be shaped by taking into account the special and

245. Schachter, supra note 153, at 315.
246. Jeffrey A. McCredie, The April 14, 1986 Bombing of Libya: Act of Self-Defense or
Reprisal?, 19 CASEW. RES. J. INT'LL. 215, 233 (1987).
247. See supra Part IV.
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complex nature of the phenomenon of terrorism. The likelihood of
eradicating terrorism forever by engaging in a response of a particular type
is extremely slight. The range of possible terrorist activities which may be
launched against a democratic state from the territory of another state turns
the war against terror into a war having multiple and varying fronts.
We have seen the different ways in which a state may sponsor
terrorism. Generally, the host state is one which supports terrorist
organizations and their activities. We have explained that a democratic
state fighting terrorist organizations is bound by the rules of international
law and is not entitled to breach them. Accordingly, its military operations
will be directed exclusively against the terrorists themselves and their
principals. Such an operation will not conclude the war against terror for every terrorist organization eradicated other similar or identical
organizations are likely to arise. It is necessary to fight on fronts additional
to the military one. It is necessary to impose economic and diplomatic
sanctions against the terrorist-sponsoring regimes themselves. Such
sanctions may deter regimes from supporting terrorist organizations and
allowing them to use the territory of the state. This will deny the terrorists
places to train and plan their activities - an outcome which may eradicate
the phenomenon of terrorism itself.
In this section, we shall discuss means of fighting other than the use of
armed force. We shall focus on economic and digital war, on targeted
assassinations, capture and trial.
A. Economic War
Apart from ideology, at the heart of every terrorist organization is the
financial structure enabling its personnel to move freely, purchase
equipment, gather intelligence, train, plan, and execute its operations. In
consequence of the terrorist attack against the United States on the
September 1lth, the U.N. Security Council decided, on September 28th,
2001, in a resolution concerning every state (not only U.N. members), to
prevent and terminate the financing of terrorist organizations throughout
the world:
[A]I1 States shall . . . [p]revent and suppress the financing of
terrorist acts... [c]riminalize the wilful provision or collection...
of funds . . . to carry out terrorist acts . . . [and] funds, other
financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or
attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the
commission of terrorist acts [and funds of] persons and entities
acting on behalf of [terrorists shall be frozen] ...
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[States shall p]rohibit their nationals or any persons or entities in
their territories from making funds, financial assets or economic
resources or financial or other related services available [to] persons
who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the
commission of terrorist acts.248
This resolution is a first step in the economic war against terror.
However, it is not a complete step. Apart from the demand of the U.N.
Security Council that the various states report within ninety days about the
measures taken by them against terror, the resolution contains no sanctions
against a state which fails to cooperate. The resolution is quiet about
sanctions - it also provides no sanctions in relation to a state which
provides resources to and finances terrorist organizations.
As noted, the resolution speaks in the language of all states. These
include states whose regimes support terror: Afghanistan (Taliban), Syria,
Iraq, Iran, and others. It may be assumed that these regimes will not fully
and genuinely cooperate with anti-terrorist states. Certainly, pressure
exerted by the international community may cause them to take certain
measures against the terrorist organizations in their territory, but these
measures are likely to be few, partial and far-removed from ending
terrorist activities within their borders. Without the threat of real economic
sanctions against the regimes supporting terrorism, the demand of the U.N.
Security Council will remain a dead letter.
Economic sanctions imposed on a state which enables a terrorist
organization to operate out of its territory will have direct ramifications on
the financial structures of the terrorist organization itself. However, these
sanctions will not be effective if the responsibility for imposing and
implementing them is conferred unilaterally on one state alone. In the past,
in consequence of terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens, the United States
retaliated by imposing economic sanctions against the state from which the
terrorists operated. A prominent example of this was the U.S. response to
Iran in 1979, after the take-over of the U.S. embassy in Tehran and capture
of hostages. The United States stopped exports and economic relations
with Iran. However, Iran did not cease providing succor to terrorists.
Former President Ronald Reagan attributed to the terrorist organization
Abu Nidal the bombing attack of December 27th, 1985 in airline offices
in Rome and Vienna, in which twenty people were killed including five
Americans. Abu Nidal was receiving support from Libya. In consequence
of this terrorist attack, U.S.-Libyan relations deteriorated. President

248. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
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Reagan demanded a halt to economic relations with Libya, and demanded
that other states also impose economic sanctions. However, a year later,
other hostile acts took place which were the responsibility of Libya.249 The
Abu Nidal terrorist organization also had branches in Syria. In November
1986, the United States decided to impose economic sanctions against
Syria. In this case, these sanctions had a clear impact - in 1987, Syria
closed the offices of the Abu Nidal terrorist organization within its
territory. 25
The United States, strong as its unilateral actions are, cannot, without
the assistance of other Western countries, achieve its goal and halt the flow
of funds to terrorist organizations. "The United States may be the world's
only superpower, but even a superpower cannot fight terrorism alone. The
increasingly transnational nature of terrorism means that it can only be
tackled transnationally, requiring the cooperation of many states, all of
whom jealously guard their national sovereignty. ' 25' The solution may be
found in international cooperation on the part of all the states of the free
world, with the aim of putting an end to the support of various regimes for
terrorist organizations and preventing the recurrence of this phenomenon
in the future. One of the means available for this purpose is an operation
with multiple participants to impose economic sanctions against states and
regimes which finance terrorist organizations.
Such cooperation should be formalized within an international
convention, the parties to which will decide upon an economic war against
states supporting terrorist organizations. In his book on states supporting
international terrorism, John F. Murphy refers to the issue of economic
sanctions and mentions the 1986 proposal made by Keith Highet (a former
president of the American Society of International Law) for a convention
to suppress the phenomenon of states financially sponsoring terrorism.2 2
This proposal refers to stringent sanctions which will be imposed on the
state sponsoring terrorism - "a state determined to be sponsoring
terrorism would be subject to a kind of 'civil death' in international
law.

253

At that time, Highet was not sure that such a convention would indeed
be signed. Many obstacles and difficulties stood in the way of obtaining
the support of all the states of the free world for a convention imposing

249. Reisman, supra note 151, at 30-31.
250. L. Paul Bremer, Counterterrorism:U.S. Policyand ProposedLegislation, 88 DEP'T ST.
BuLL. 44, 46 (Jan. 1988).
251. Waxman, supra note 4, at 205.
252. MURPHY, supra note 209, at 77.
253. Id. at 78.
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severe economic sanctions. States having close economic relations with
other states giving economic support to terror would probably refuse to
sign such a convention, as imposing such sanctions on the wrongdoing
state would adversely affect its own interests. 254 Highet was aware of this
and explained:
The modest proposal now being presented . . sets aside these
obvious practical and political difficulties and does so on purpose.
It proceeds on the theory - which may be mistaken, but which has
not really been argued - that even though we are not there yet, at
the present rate we are going to be at a juncture in perhaps 10 or 15
years where there is sufficient consensus to implement against a
sponsoring State in the form of an international agreement, and that
we should therefore start facing up to the realities now. It also
proceeds on the theory that having a previously agreed menu of
possible common actions, and a standing mechanism for
determining a "sponsor" State's responsibility, may make a political
consensus easier to achieve than would otherwise be the case.
Finally, it proceeds on the theory that the particular structure of the
proposal is such that once two States have entered into agreement,
there will be an incentive for others, within a predetermined group
of potential parties... to join the group. Most will not wish to be
"outside the pale" for long. 55
Highet said this in 1986. Exactly fifteen years later, on September 11 th,
2001, the consensus for such a convention was born.
The importance of such a convention and its potential contribution to
the war against terror is tremendous. First, it would provide ex-ante
deterrence. States will be aware of the enormous risks they will be taking
if they support terrorism. Awareness of a world consensus condemning
terrorist acts and ajoint willingness, as well as ability, to retaliate will put
the policy of the state granting economic support for terrorism into
question. The deterrence will be ex post facto in relation to such states as

254. Id. at 78-79.
255. Id.
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already provide economic sponsorship of terrorism; however, the fear of
the sanctions which may be implemented against them will cause them to
cease their sponsorship immediately.
Such a convention would be an extremely important confirmation
of the impermissibility of state-sponsored terrorism and would put
states on notice that they risked the imposition of severe sanctions
by their actions. It would also send a message to states other than
potential target states that the states parties to the convention were
determined to deal with the problem and that these other states
should join them in this effort. The convention would demonstrate
the costs of these
convincingly the willingness of the parties to2 pay
5
sanctions and to share these costs equitably. 6
Everything possible must be done in order to obtain the support of
democratic countries for a convention calling for an economic war on
terrorism. In a situation where there are economic ties with states
supporting terrorism, it is necessary to prevent unwanted ramifications for
state parties by reason of the sanctions on their economic partners. The
way to do this is similar to the way in which the U.N. Charter prevents
unwanted ramifications for states following the imposition of economic
sanctions by the U.N. Security Council on a particular state. Article 50 of
the U.N. Charter provides:
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken
by the Security Council,-any other state, whether a Member of the
United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special
economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures
shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to
a solution of those problems.2"7
Likewise, it is possible to provide in the convention that the member
states will assist the state injured by reason of the imposition of the
sanctions. On the basis of such an international convention, an
international body can be established in order to fight the financing of

256. Id. at 82.
257. U.N. CHARTER art. 50.
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terrorist activities. This body will expose all the sources and movements
of the funds. The regime which is found to be the source of the fund
transfers will be subject to severe economic sanctions which will be taken
against it simultaneously by all the other states of the free world. The
response must be total severance of all economic ties, trade, exports,
imports, and so on. Such a multilateral response is likely to have an effect
on critical economic interests of the sponsoring state and its citizens.
When a state is threatened by such a convention, it is doubtful whether it
will continue permitting the transfer of money to terrorists.
B. Preemptive Action in Self-Defense
We have seen that terrorists are not entitled to the protection conferred
on combatants by international law, and certainly not to the protection
conferred on innocent civilians. Throughout history, in war, armies have
killed the soldiers of the enemy and those killings have been justified.25 8
In a war between the army of a state and a terrorist organization, can we
allow the forces of the state to kill terrorists who are known to be about to
launch an attack against the citizens of a state, where that killing may
prevent the planned attack, all as part of the doctrine of self-defense? Or
should we prevent the state from fulfilling its obligation to protect its
citizens because the operation under consideration is preemptive? If we
understand that it is justified to preempt a person who plans to kill me, by
killing him first, why can one not draw an analogy and kill a person who
plans to slaughter an entire community?
We have seen the various interpretations given to the term self-defense
in international law. Self-defense in customary international law is broader
than in treaty law, and enables a party to act in self-defense in respect of
every act of aggression so long as the required response is necessary and
proportional to a real and imminent threat, and all attempts to resolve the
dispute by peaceful means have been exhausted. In this way, customary
international law enables defensive action - namely, an action which will
preempt an anticipated disaster.
On the other hand, according to treaty law, an act of self-defense is
only possible in response to an armed attack. In Part VI we examined
whether a terrorist action is an armed attack. We explained that if the
threat is prolonged, terrorist actions took place in the past and additional
actions are expected to take place in the future, it is possible to see the
terrorist activity as an armed attack. We mentioned that in Nicaragua v.
UnitedStates the International Court of Justice did not identify the terrorist

258. Schmitt, supra note 191, at 611.
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action as an armed attack, but, after the terrorist assault on the United
States on September 1Ith, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution
acknowledging the right to self-defense within the context of terrorist
attacks. Accordingly, it would seem that current times require a
modification of the approach of the International Court of Justice in
Nicaragua.Logic dictates that when a state is aware that a terrorist attack
is about to be launched against its citizens, it has a duty to protect those
citizens and prevent the attack, even if this will involve the use of physical
force against those responsible, perpetrators and principals.5 9
In the current conflict with the Palestinians, the state of Israel carries
out targeted preemptive operations against terrorists. Even those who
oppose this policy agree that:
Israel has the full right to defend itself: if official Palestinian
spokesmen declare that they plan to send dozens of suicide bombers
who will explode themselves in the heart of Israeli cities - do not
be surprised if Israel acts in such an extreme
way so as to preempt
26 °
these acts and make them more difficult.

We should note that article 51 of the U.N. Charter uses language which
enables a response to an armed attack even prior to the armed attack taking
place if the threatened attack is imminent. In cases where a preemptive
strike is allowed against terrorists a number of requirements must be met
prior to engaging in that preemptive strike. First, it must be emphasized
that we are not dealing with a strike as a punitive measure in response to
the past actions of terrorists who now no longer pose a threat, nor are we
dealing with a preemptive strike which is intended to prevent the terrorists
from having a fair trial. We are dealing with the possibility of engaging in
a preemptive strike against terrorists who, it is known, are about to carry
out a terrorist action, and where the state targeted by the terrorists is
interested in preempting that activity in order to defend the state and its
citizens. The purpose is to prevent future terrorist activities; otherpurposes
which are not preventative will not justify a preemptive action.2I
A preemptive strike should not be carried out if other means are
available to prevent the occurrence of the anticipated terrorist activity. In
other words, a preemptive strike is allowed only when other measures

259. Sofaer, supra note 42, at 95.
260. David Grossman, A Stupid and Dangerous Act, YEDIOTACHARONOT, Sept. 3, 2001. The
translation is that of the author.
261. Gross, supra note 158, at 215.
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which may prevent the terrorists from carrying out their plans are not
available, including, for example, placing the terrorists on trial - in short,
where no other means exists to prevent the terrorists from carrying out
their, intentions in practice.262
There are those who argue that it is only possible to engage in a
preemptive strike as part of the right to self-defense when the persons
whom the state plans to kill are persons who pose an immediate threat, the
measure is necessary and proportional to the event which is about to occur
and which the state wishes to prevent, and indeed there is convincing
evidence beyond any reasonable doubt that the terrorist activity is about
to take place. Additionally, the terrorists in respect of whom
263 the
preemptive strike is planned must be participants in that activity.
In my opinion, this standard is too high. Indisputably, there is a need
for intelligence information which refers to future terrorist plans and
identifies the participants in the plans. However, as the bodies which
decide on preemptive strikes are the security authorities and not the
judicial authorities, it is necessary to be satisfied with a standard of clear
and convincing evidence and not a degree of certainty which is beyond any
reasonable doubt.
Beyond this, it is necessary to engage in a process of identifying the
intended terrorist victim, in the field, prior to executing him. This
identification must be to a high standard of certainty that the target is
indeed the terrorist, in order to prevent the execution of innocent
persons. 2' To summarize, a preemptive strike based on self-defense will
be justified under international law if it involves killing a person when
there is information that he is a member of a terrorist organization which
plans to engage in terrorist activities, in circumstances where no other
reasonable alternative is available which is less destructive. "When one is
about to kill you, do everything necessary in order to thwart his intention.
If there is no alternative but to kill him, strike first. If there is an alternative
him, thwart his intention without striking first, without
other than killing
' 265
killing him.

262. CASHER, supra note 157, at 48.
263. Sara N. Scheideman, Standards of Proof in Forcible Responses to Terrorism, 50

SYRACUSE L. REV. 249, 283 (2000).
264. See Coil, supra note 24, at 305.
265. CASHER, supra note 157, at 56.
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C. Digital War
One of the elements common to the range of definitions of terror is the
fear spread among the entire civilian population. For example,"'terrorism'
means the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of
violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public
in fear. ' 266 Even if their activities result in the killing of only a single
person, terrorists may succeed in frightening millions of other civilians.
Many believe that terrorists could not achieve this outcome without the
help of the free press: "The two most important issues concerning
terrorism which confront the police and the media are the issue of access
by the media to in-progress terrorist events and the issue of the media's
portrayal of terrorists., 267 Terrorists wish to gain benefits from media
publicity and therefore they cooperate with it. The media helps the
terrorists spread an atmosphere of fear in society and provides the
terrorists with opportunities to air their claims before the general public.
Further, the media confers upon terrorists legitimacy to which they are not
entitled.
This is not to say that the media plays this role willingly with the
intention of collaborating with the terrorists. However, disregarding the
media's psychological motivations, the outcome of terrorist incidents leads
to the conclusion that the media provides an excellent channel for
transmitting the fear which the terrorists wish to inspire in society as a
whole:
The terrorism of the last century depended extensively on media
coverage and the dissemination of the perpetrator's claims, as well
as exposing the inability of the state to prevent their actions. Thus,
they sought to achieve power outcomes through the manipulation
of the media,268 or by exploiting the media's attraction to
sensationalism.
Generally, in democratic societies one refers to the media in connection
with the right of the public to know and freedom of expression. The media
is turned into a watchdog through which the public interest is achieved by

266. English Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, § 20.
267. ABRAHAM H. MILLER, TERRORISM: THE MEDIA AND THE LAW 3 (1982).
268.

M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS

(1937-2001) 49 (2001).
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the free flow of information. 269 But it must be emphasized that the media
fulfills an important public and social function, and as such its activities
concern the public as a whole, and have repercussions on society as a
whole. This is the reason why information must not be restricted, for
example, in relation to knowledge about the regime, and access must be
granted to the media. But this is precisely also the reason why obligations
must be imposed on the media. The latter must recognize the responsibility
accompanying the influence it exerts, precisely because of its duty to the
public. 270 It must exercise internal censorship when it decides whether to
publish information concerning acts of terror or interviews with terrorists.
Is it conceivable that the panic which the terrorists so successfully sow will
be the inescapable price to be paid by us for life in a democratic society?
Because of the public function fulfilled by the media, it is customary
to subject media activities to the test of near certainty, whereby in the
clash between freedom of expression on one hand and public order and
national security on the other, the publication will only be restricted when
publication of the expression will cause a severe, real, and harsh injury to
public order and national security, and the likelihood of the occurrence of
the injury is at the level of near certainty.2 7' However, an examination of
this test reveals that it was designed in the light of the governmental
paradigm. In other words, the reason for the strict and rigorous protection
given to freedom of expression is not only its democratic value, but also,
in the light of institutional factors, fear of governmental interference.27 2
The governmental paradigm focuses on the element limiting freedom of
expression - the government. The paradigm is not relevant when we deal
with publications about terrorist acts. In such cases, the elements which
have an interest in restricting the expression are the public and regime
together - both are exposed to the dangers of terrorist acts, both therefore
are obliged to avoid giving these acts a platform.
The public interest in the free flow of information is considerable. As
such, it must be restrained and supervised in order to prevent it from being
improperly used, whether knowingly or unknowingly.27 3 The restraint and
supervision to be implemented in the confrontation with international

269. Aharon Barak, The Tradition of Freedom of Expression in Israel and its Problems, 27
MISHPATIM 223, 237-40 (1997).
270. See id. at 238.
271. See generally H.C. 73/53 "Ko-Ha'am" Co., Ltd. v. Minister of the Interior, 7 P.D. 871

(Heb.).
272. P. Lahav, On Freedom of Expression in the Case Law of the Supreme Court, 7
MISHPATIM 375, 409-10 (1977).
273. Barak, supra note 269, at 246.
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terror does not relate to internal censorship but to overly extensive
coverage. The media not only increases tension by reporting current
terrorist acts but also intensifies the panic felt by the public by
broadcasting terrorist threats of future attacks. Moreover, it provides the
terrorists with an opportunity to broadcast their message to the general
public, an opportunity which would not have been open to them had they
operated within the accepted channels of a democratic society. It is the use
of terror which provides them with a platform; a platform which they
exploit to disseminate their message and objectives as if they were
politicians and not criminals. The truth must be told and remain within the
minds of the media - the terrorist preaches murder, and preaching murder
should be placed outside the proper boundaries of the public discourse.274
The reports and publications must be moderated, restrained, factual, and
confined to bringing the facts of the incident to the knowledge of the
public, the reports should not inspire the fear and hysteria among the
members of the public so eagerly sought by every terrorist.
The media must engage in responsible, restrained and critical
journalism in connection with terror and those perpetrating it. The line
must be found between responsible coverage and the exploitation of
terrorists of that coverage. Incessant reporting elevates the worth of the
terrorists in their own eyes and in the eyes of some members of the public.
The coverage strengthens them and encourages them to persist with their
violence. 275 The media must internalize the fact that while its duty to
protect the right of the public to know has supreme value, human life is
balancing against it. In such circumstances, the priorities must be clear and
lead the media to engage in censorship by abstention. "[A]s the media
became more savvy and as responsible journalism curtailed some of the
manifestations of sensationalism in the coverage of terror-violence
incidents, the media im act waned. Consequently, attacks motivated by
media impact reduced.
It is one thing to permit access to the media in order to give expression
to the autonomy and self-determination of individuals in society or for the
sake of the needs of democracy and exposing the political truth; it is
another thing to permit free access to all those interested in destroying the
modem society and the media operating within it. 277 In consequence of the

274. See BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, TERRORISM: HOW THE WEST CAN WIN 110 (1986).

275. See Joan Deppa, InternationalTerrorism: Prevention and Remedies: Media Coverage:
Help or Hindrance?, 22 SYRACUSE J.INT'L L. &COM. 25, 29 (1996).
276. BASSIOUNI, supra note 268, at 49.
277. A. Dayan Auerbach, The Democratic Model of Freedom of Expression, 20 IUNEI
MISHPAT 377, 380-82 (1997).
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terrorist attack on the United States on September 11th, 2001, the United
States unified around exceptional legislation in the U.S. Patriot Act,278
which internalizes, inter alia, the proper new balance which must be made
between the right of the public to know and national security. National
security has priority in the war conducted by a democratic state against a
terrorist organization. All the countries of the free world which are
exposed to the danger of international terror must imitate this type of
legislation and work to enforce it.
D. Capture and Trial
We have seen that one of the conditions which a state must meet before
realizing its right to self-defense is that there has been an attempt to
resolve the dispute by peaceful means. When at war with a terrorist
organization, the state is required to avoid any warlike activity if it is
possible to seize the terrorist, arrest him, and place him on trial.2 79 This
requirement is part of the theory that while a war between a terrorist
organization and a state is not a conventional war, like a war it must meet
the basic requirement of international law, i.e., the state must abstain in so
far as possible from an aggressive act if the desired outcome can be
achieved by other ways.
There are those who believe that as a rule it is not possible to talk of a
war between a democratic state and a terrorist organization. A war takes
place between two states, between combatants, or freedom fighters. We
have seen that terrorists do not fall within these definitions and therefore
not only must the state abstain from an act of aggression and work towards
stopping the terrorists by placing them on trial, but this course of action is
the principal one available to a democratic state in its struggle against
terror. In that struggle the term war is not relevant and the right of the state
to self-defense does not arise:
Under international law, we could not be at "war" with an entity
that has a status less than that of an insurgent.., unless that entity
is directly involved with others engaged in a "war." If we are
fighting insurgents, we would be at "war" in at least one sense -

278. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (U.S.A. PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272

(2001).
279. Jackson, supra note 54, at 686-87; see also Gross, supra note 158, at 239-40.
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regarding application of certain laws of war. We would clearly be
at "war" if we are fighting a "belligerent.. ." We could also be at
war with a state.., or nation... We could not be at "war" with
Osama Bin Laden, since he and his entourage are in no way
representatives or leaders, et al., of an "insurgency" within the
meaning of international law. He is 2also
not a recognized leader of
80
a "nation," "belligerent," or "state.
The criticism is that a democratic nation need not return war but should
make use of the democratic measures available to the nation by virtue of
its democratic character, i.e., seizing the terrorists, arresting them, and
placing them on trial. Though the terrorists are not combatants according
to international law, they breach the rules of international law, and their
conduct is criminal. Following the September attack against the United
States, it was declared: "It is clear that the individuals who perpetrated the
attacks committed a crime under international law."28 '
These are crimes which have a name: acts of terror. However, they are
no different from any other crime. While it is true that these are
ideological crimes, which are more severe than ordinary crimes, the
characterization as severe is a function of their impact - a fact which is
not relevant to the characterization of the offence as criminal. These are
crimes against a state, against humanity, and are even war crimes. A
democratic state must deal with these crimes, not with the tools of war but
with the means standing at its disposal, routinely used to deal with crime
the law enforcement agencies and the wheels of justice.
The method for dealing with these crimes is not by going to war. An
act of war which leads to the killing of a terrorist will not eradicate the
phenomenon of terrorism. "Terrorism is not analogous to war because it
is essentially a crime, and crimes are best dealt with through law
enforcement, even when supplemented by paramilitary or military
personnel. The response to terrorism is the pursuit ofjustice, relentless and
unyielding. 282

280. Jordan Paust, ASIL Insights: War and Responses to Terrorism, available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
281. John Cerone, ASIL Insights: Acts of War and State Responsibility in "Muddy Waters":
The Non-State Actor Dilemma, available at http://www.asil.orglinsights/insigh77.htm (last visited

Mar. 22, 2003).
282. M. Cherif Bassiouni, In the Aftermath: Seeking Revenge or Justice? On the Dark Trail

of New Criminals, U.S. Needs Help, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 23, 2001, at 3.
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We have seen that one of the characteristics of international terrorism
is the multiplicity of branches it has throughout the world. The activities
themselves are activities carried out by individuals from all over the world
who cooperate with each other. In the recent action against the United
States, Osama bin Laden may have given birth to the idea, but those who
planned and carried it out were terrorists from outside the United States,
dispersed in a variety of places, not only Afghanistan, as well as terrorists
from inside the country. In other words:
[T]he more immediate danger for U.S. security is not in
Afghanistan. The fight against terrorism must be worldwide, and
that means the administration cannot successfully pursue a
unilateral approach. A country, no matter how powerful, cannot by
itself fight a few small criminal organizations scattered all over the
world. For sure, it cannot fight them with cruise missiles, aircraft
carriers and tanks, even though resorting to such force may be
legally justified on occasion.283
The response required is not the elimination of Osama bin Laden in
Afghanistan. Such a response would only amount to the isolated treatment
of one branch of international terrorism. From a long-term perspective the
danger posed by terrorist activities will not disappear. Osama bin Laden
is not the only terrorist. By these comments, I am not suggesting that we
should not act against Osama bin Laden. The emphasis here is that the
right way to proceed would be to capture him, like all the other terrorists
around the globe, and bring him to trial. This is the most reasonable option
available to a democratic country in its fight against international
terrorism, as it is inconceivable that one country like the United States,
however strong, could fight all the terrorists around the globe singlehandedly. The capture and bringing to justice of terrorists is not an easy
task when placed on the shoulders of a single state, in a unilateral manner.
In the light of the unique nature of international terrorism as an
unidentified enemy that may be found everywhere and threatens the entire
free world, the solution is to be found in cooperation on the part of all
states. Such cooperation would not be directed at fighting terrorism in the
military sense; rather, the cooperation would focus on law enforcement
agencies and intelligence agencies in each country. Such cooperation

283. Id.
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should be expressed in the transfer of intelligence regarding terrorists,
making it easier for the state wishing to extradite them, the transfer of
evidence regarding their crimes, and the freezing of assets and property
used to finance their crimes. Such international cooperation would help
expose the movements of the terrorists, help preempt their activities and
help bring them to justice.
The shocking consequences of the September 1 th terrorist attack on
the United States led the media to emphasize that the citizens of the United
States were waiting for the United States to respond militarily. Such a
response was not long in coming. However, one must ask - what will be
the ultimate outcome of such a response? Will it lead to the eradication of
international terrorism or will we later find that the military response only
met the need for revenge of the United States, without achieving the goal
of really wiping out terrorism? Such a goal will only be met by
collaborative endeavors on the part of democratic states to enforce law and
justice, in addition to engaging in other measures which are not military,
such as the economic sanctions described above. Accordingly, "[t]he
question now is whether the American people will be satisfied with the
pursuit of justice, which can only come through legal means, or whether
they will want revenge, which will push the administration into extralegal
practices. ,,284
The democratic states must respond to the terrorist threat within the
framework of the rule of law by bringing suspects to trial. Military
responses against all organizations throughout the world would turn the
democratic states into collaborators with the terrorists whose goals are to
undermine the stability of civilized Western society. This is a great danger
to democratic societies, a danger of which we must be aware and against
which we must defend.
VIII. VICTORY IN THE WAR BETWEEN A DEMOCRATIC STATE

AND ATERRORIST ORGANIZATION
We have seen that war in its traditional sense is a term which deals with
a struggle between two states. The term victory in war was coined to apply
to the parties to that war - states. In this section, we shall try to examine
whether the term victory in war and its interpretation within the context of
a war between states is applicable to the special circumstances of a war
between a state and a terrorist organization. Is it possible to speak of a

284. Id.
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victory over a terrorist organization? - a real victory which will totally
suppress the phenomenon of terrorism?
Victory has a dual aspect in the modem war: objective victory achieving the political objectives for which the war was launched, and
subjective victory - the sense of society that the price paid to engage in
the military action in order to achieve the objectives of the war was
reasonable. Assessing the cost of the military action is always dependent
on the importance attributed to the political objectives of the war.285
Where the war is being waged between states, it is easier to define the
nature of the victory. A war may end with a single victor when the enemy
is forced from the battle zone; the enemy may capitulate upon recognizing
that he has been defeated, putting a halt to the fighting and enabling the
other party to achieve his political goals; or the enemy may acknowledge
his inferiority if caused sufficient death and destruction.
A genuine victory in war is a situation in which one of the parties
succeeds in achieving the goals formulated by the decision-makers prior
to and during the military campaign. In this type of victory there may be
more than a single victor; alternatively, the victory may be partial and only
achieve some of the objectives identified.
What is victory over terror? Following the September 11 th attack, the
President of the United States declared in his speech before Congress:
"Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will
not end until every
terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped
' 28 6
defeated.
and
The objective victory, therefore, is the total eradication of the terrorist
organizations. Accordingly, partially attaining this goal would not be in the
nature of a victory:
[O]ne must wonder whether such a war can even be won? Radical
Islamist leaders, such as Osama Bin Laden and Sheik AbdelRahman have a widespread following and potentially huge reserves
of willing martyrs at their disposal, so that for every one captured
or killed, there are ten to take his place. When faced with such a
dedicated adversary, the most likely outcome is a war of attrition
rather than a decisive victory in the conventional military sense.287

285. INBAR, supra note 167, at 72-75.
286. Bush, supra note 1.
287. Waxman, supra note 4, at 207.
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Human desire to win every conflict is universal and understandable.
The desire to prevail over terrorism is common to the circle of democratic
states, but it is not global so long as there are regimes which continue to
sponsor terrorism.
We have already explained that the war on terror is not a war against
an identifiable enemy. Identifying the location of a single terrorist
organization, attacking and eliminating it, is a victory in only one battle.
Victory in the war is a much lengthier and more complex process.
Terrorism is a phenomenon based on the implementation of extreme,
militant, and fundamental ideology.
Primarily motivating much of the global terrorist network is antiWestern hostility. The goal of these terrorist groups is to drive the West
back and, in its place, impose an extreme and fundamentalist version of
Islam as the dominant world power. The terrorists, who have complete
faith in the justice of this ideology, adhere to it and are willing to sacrifice
their lives for it in the belief of a heavenly reward. The success of a single
terrorist action strengthens the resolve of terrorists dispersed over the
entire world, and causes others who believe in the same ideology to join
their ranks.
The goals of terrorism, as shown on the 1 th September in the
United States, are completely different from most of the successful
terrorism of the 20th century. We are talking of fundamentalist
Islamic elements, who see the perpetrators as part of a "Jihad,"
"holy war" - perceived by the faithful to be a religious, global and
unlimited obligation, which will continue until the entire world
accepts the Muslim faith or is placed under Muslim control.88
Such a situation raises the question whether a genuine victory over
terrorism - one that will cause the phenomenon of terrorism to disappear
absolutely and forever - is feasible. As the phenomenon of terrorism is
based on faith and ideology, we can never be certain that a person, living
according to his beliefs, will not decide to put his beliefs into practice by
whatever means necessary to achieve that result. As we showed in the
previous section, it is possible to take measures which will undermine the
capabilities of the organization, seriously injure its personnel, and
obliterate its infrastructure. However, all this can only conclude the war,
or bring about a halt in the fighting, for a period; it will not be a victory in
the sense of eradicating the threat of terrorism forever.

288. Yossi Deskel, Way of the Mind, Not the Might, HA'ARETz, Nov. 11, 2001, at 2B.
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In a war between two states, the classic way to end the war is by a
peace treaty. Such a treaty puts an end to the fighting and regulates the
peaceful relations between the parties. The object is to conclude not
merely the armed dispute but the dispute as a whole. 28 9 A peace treaty
ensures to a standard of near certainty that the objective victory in the war
- defeat of the enemy is attained. Nothing is allowed to undermine this
achievement, not even the vanquished state which entered into the treaty
and acknowledged its defeat.
In a war between states and terrorist organizations, this ideal manner
of ending the war - a peace treaty - is not relevant. Peace is the enemy
of terror, an enemy to which terrorism does not intend to yield. Beyond
this, a state organ which signs a peace treaty with a terrorist organization
will be according recognition to that terrorist organization, an outcome
which is inconceivable.
Upon defeating a state, there are bodies, such as the U.N. Security
Council, which have the function of ensuring that the military forces of the
other party can no longer pose a threat. Overseeing a state having defined
geographical boundaries, whose military activities are largely open to
view, is easier than overseeing a terrorist organization. Our ability to
supervise terrorist organizations is very limited and perhaps even
nonexistent. Beyond the geographic difficulty and multiplicity of branches
throughout the world, which are inherent to the phenomenon of terrorism,
there are many other difficulties. The leadership of the organization is not
always known, and its ability to reestablish itself, or at least to sow the
seeds for future terrorist organizations, is greater than our ability to ensure
that it will not so reestablish itself. Our capabilities in this regard are
limited and substantially different to our supervisory capacity in relation
to states.
The nature of a terrorist organization and the ideology on which it is
built are not matters which are tangible and subject to supervision or,
indeed, to intervention. Accordingly, victory. over a terrorist organization
does not necessarily have the meaning attributable to victory over a state
organization.
In his work Misperceivingthe TerroristThreat,Jeffrey D. Simon refers
to the phenomenon of terrorism as war and explains that it is not a war in
which a victory is possible:
A U.S. war on terrorism would be a long conflict; it would also be
unwinnable in the military sense, given the multitude of terrorist

289. DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 38-39.
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groups that operate throughout the world..... Terrorists can reverse
any counterterrorist "progress" or claims of victory with one wellplaced symbolic bomb. This is what separates a war on terrorism
from all other types of conflict. The problem can then become one
of alienated American public blaming the military for "losing" a
war that never could have been won. 29
The President of the United States, aware of this problem yet
determined to win the war against terrorism, explained:
Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will
direct every resource at our command - every means of
diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every, instrument of law
enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary
weapon of war - to the disruption and to the defeat of the global
terror network. 91
Victory in such a war requires a fight in numerous varied fronts.
Beyond necessary military action against the terrorists themselves,
stringent diplomatic, economic and military sanctions must be imposed on
states sponsoring terrorism. Imposing and enforcing such sanctions
requires exceptional cooperation between the nations of the free world.
The cooperation must be based on unequivocal and unreserved agreement;
the policy towards terrorism must be uncompromising and involve the
termination of all governmental support and collaboration with it.
In his article on international terrorism and multilateral treaties,
Bassiouni deals with the need for international cooperation of this type. In
his view, because of the lack of an international consensus regarding the
definition of terrorism, there is also no consensus as to the way to respond
to terrorism:
There is . . . no international agreed upon methodology for the
identification and appraisal of what is commonly referred to as
"terrorism," including: causes, strategies, goals, and outcomes of
the conduct in question and as to those who perpetrate violent
conduct against protected persons or targets or who engage in such
conduct in an unlawful manner. There is also no international
consensus as to the appropriate reactive strategies and means of
individual states and the international community. As a result, it is
290. SIMON, supra note 235, at 11.
291. Bush, supra note 1.
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difficult to identify who, why, how, or what is sought to be
prevented, controlled and suppressed.292
International terrorism in the Twenty-First Century as seen in the
terrorist attack of the September 11 th in the United States, and the dangers
entailed by the use of biological and atomic weapons, requires the
international community to cooperate at least in so far as relates to the
extradition of terrorists and the enforcement of the criminal law against
them:
[The] new terrorist threats to contemporary society's wide-ranging
vulnerabilities necessitate a more determined will on behalf of the
international community to effectively cooperate in detecting,
preventing, and deterring potential perpetrators and prosecuting and
punishing those who commit such crimes. Specifically, enhanced
international cooperation is needed in the areas of extradition,
mutual legal assistance, transfer of criminal proceedings, transfer
of prisoners, seizure and forfeiture of assets, and recognition of
foreign penal judgments.293
Today, there are a number of conventions dealing with terrorism; the
most recent is the Convention for the Suppression of Financing of
Terrorism adopted in 1999.294 In the view of Bassiouni it is necessary to

292. BASSIOUNI, supra note 268, at 9.
293. Id. at 53.
294. International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 109,
U.N. GAOR 6th Comm, 54th Sess., 76th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (1999). There are also
other proposals. See, e.g., Draft Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, U.N.
GAOR 6th Comm., 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/53/L.4 (1998); Draft Comprehensive Convention
on International Terrorism, Working Document Submitted by India, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 55th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/55/1 (2000).
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consolidate all the conventions and criminal regulation concerning
terrorism, in a single international code:
Multilateralism should replace the archaic, inefficient and
politicized bilateralism, and all modalities of inter-State penal
cooperation should be integrated. Thus, multilateral treaties and
national legislation should integrate the following modalities:
extradition; legal assistance; transfer of criminal proceedings;
transfer of prisoners; transfer of sentences; recognition of foreign
penal judgments; tracing, freezing and seizing of assets derived
from criminal activity; and, law-enforcement and prosecutorial
cooperation.29
Unquestionably, it is impossible to talk of victory over terrorism
without putting together strong and genuine cooperation against the
terrorist organizations, articulated in a convention of the type described,
and most importantly, enforced in practice. Enforcing the conventions on
the international plane is the only possible way of denying the terrorists the
capacity to plan their operations, gather intelligence, and collect weapons
and funding. The terrorists will be precluded from implementing their
beliefs, leaving the rest of the world to practice theirs, and perhaps
allowing the promise of President Bush that we will win the war on
terrorism to be fulfilled.
IX. CONCLUSION

The latest terrorist attack on the United States on September 11 th and
the declaration of war on international terrorism which followed in its
wake raises many questions in relation to the lawfulness and rules of this
war. In this Article, we have tried to examine whether the prevailing laws
of war in international law may be interpreted in a manner which accords
with modern reality, in which war is no longer confined to sovereign
entities, but is waged instead between democratic states and unidentified
groups called terrorist organizations. In view of the special nature of the
enemy - terrorism which, by definition, does not see itself as subject to
the rules of war, however these rules are construed - it is difficult to
conclude that the rules as they exist today, and in particular self-defense

295. BASSIOUNI, supra note 268, at 67.
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under article 51 of the U.N. Charter, provide an adequate solution to the
terrorist threat.
We must understand that we are dealing with a network of terrorism
buried deep in different areas of the world. This situation is not conducive
to the implementation of traditional laws of war, which were shaped with
interstate relations in mind. Even if we accept the interpretation of selfdefense which permits a democratic state to defend itself against the
terrorist threat by way of military action, numerous questions arise in
relation to the rules of engagement. How will a democratic state conduct
a war against an undefined enemy which is dispersed among the civilian
population? Should the democratic state remain subject to the rules of war
and avoid causing harm to population centers and thereby also avoid
causing harm to the terrorists themselves? Or, does the goal of eradicating
terrorismjustify all means, including collateral injury to innocent civilians,
merely because the terrorists have found shelter among them?
Is it conceivable that in time of war the law falls silent? This is
precisely the time when we most need the law, as President of the Supreme
Court of Israel, Justice Aharon Barak, asserted:
When the cannons roar the muses fall silent. However, even when
the cannons roar, it is necessary to preserve the rule of law. A
society's ability to withstand its enemies is based on its recognition
that it is fighting for values worthy of protection. The rule of law is
one of these values.29'
Terrorism has directed its efforts at demolishing what democratic
societies have sought to build. The rule of law is a central and basic
component of democratic society and one on which it continues to build.
If we were to allow a democratic state in its war against terror to breach
the laws of war on the ground that the other side also breaches them, we
would not thereby be helping the state to defeat its enemy - we would be
helping the enemy defeat us. We would undermine the rule of law and the
stability of civilized society. We would cause democratic states to lose
their character. We must avoid this result at all costs.
Terrorism is an international problem which feeds on the unusual
cooperation between those dealing with terrorism throughout the world.
The solution too must be international and it too must be nourished by a

296. H.C. 168/91 Marcus v. Minister of Defense and others, 45 (1) P.D. 467, 470. The
translation is that of the author.
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unique cooperation between the elements of the free world facing a
terrorist threat.
As noted, the laws of war must be modified. We must formulate new
laws for the war waged between democratic states and terrorist
organizations. These laws will not relate to war in its traditional sense of
aircraft, tank and infantry attacks. The term war will be given a different
meaning. The laws will have one common denominator: cooperation. First,
action must be taken against those sponsoring terrorism. We saw in Part
VI the special problem of terrorism sponsored by states. States may
support terrorists by supplying them with funds, training areas, logistical
infrastructure, or simply permission to use the territory of the state.
The laws of the new war must be shaped in such a way as to exert
intense international pressure on states sponsoring terrorism, so as to
persuade them to desist. Beyond this, we must establish a new normative
framework, the purpose of which is to create a new world order based on
justice. Innocent civilians will no longer fall victim to horrific terrorist acts
while the guilty parties walk free.
A new convention should unite the nations of the free world in order
to fight for the future of humanity. However, this fight cannot take the
form of a military operation targeting single organizations. One or two
operations cannot eradicate the phenomenon of terrorism. The fight is
much more complex: it is a hybrid comprising passive and active defense
measures to ward off the terrorist groups. The combination of the two
should have sufficient deterrent effect to eliminate the terrorist threat
which hangs over democratic states. Accordingly, the new convention
should reflect the combination ofdiverse measures available to democratic
states in their fight against terrorism, as we explained in Part VII:
1. Cooperation of the state parties to the convention in imposing
multilateral economic sanctions on every state sponsoring terrorism,
freezing their assets, and freezing the bank accounts of the terrorists,
and organizations to which they belong, throughout the world.
2. Cooperation between the media and democratic states to promote more
moderate and factual coverage of terrorism, coverage which will
refrain from collaborating with the terrorists by helping to spread fear
and panic among the general public.
3. Intelligence and law enforcement cooperation among the various states
which will lead to the arrest and extradition of the terrorists to the
appropriate state for trial.
4. Targeted or preemptive attacks against terrorists, on the part of the
state parties, should also be included in the convention. However, clear
rules should be established as to when a targeted attack is permitted,
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and such an attack should be avoided if cooperation on the part of the
state parties can lead to the extradition of the terrorists who would
otherwise be targeted.
The United States has undertaken to lead the war against terror. In
order to succeed in this difficult task it is essential not only to unite the
world as to the ways and means of achieving this goal but also to
understand the roots and rationale of this human phenomenon. Only
informed understanding of the roots of terrorism and its reasons, together
with a united international front under the leadership of the strongest world
power, can lead to a change of the existing reality. I conclude with the
reflections of one who was responsible for dealing with terrorism in Israeli
intelligence:
There is no doubt that one source of the hatred felt towards the
West is the gloomy economic situation prevailing in most of the
Islamic states, ensuing from the nature of their regimes.
Accordingly, in the long term, the West will also have to deal with
this by disseminating the ideology of liberal democracies. Global
benefits will begin when the United States focuses on achieving
victory by conquering the conceptual ground.297

297. Deskel, supra note 288, at 2B. The translation is that of the author.
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